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The Effect of the Treaty of Trianon
on Hungary
I. Introduction-
On June 4, 1920, the Treaty of Trianon between the
Allied Powers and Hungary was signed. Sufficient time ha
elapsed since that date for the general effects of the
document to become manifest. Although the entire truth
may not yet be known I shall endeavor, in the following
thesis, to describe Hungary as she was before the World
War, her part in European politics, the recognition
which she received from the Allied Powers at the Peace
Conference according to the Treaty of Trianon, and some
of the post-war problems created thereby.

II. History of Hungary
-
Old Hungary was in itself a geographical unit, and
has been likened to a soup-bowl. The fertile, low plain
was the bowl, with the rim of mountains resembling the
Swiss Alps in relief. The country had theoretically
1
.
three parts; first, the low plain, known as the Alffild,
a very wealthy granary; second, the mountains on almost
all sides of the plain, and thirdly, Hungary* s natural
waterways and outlets . The port of Fiume was her own
outlet to the Mediterranean Sea and points beyond. In
addition, the Danube and its tributaries within the
country made its location important, and the wealth which
nature had given the territory gave Hungary an opportuni-
ty to supply world markets. She was both strategically
located and economically well-equipped. Hungary con-
tained formerly one hundred and twenty-five thousand
square miles of territory, and had a population of twenty
million people.
Hungary was originally Inhabited by the Huns, but
the predominating race through its history was the Magyar
race. The origin of the Magyars is obscure, and authori-
ties differ greatly on this point. Practically all
1. Bass, The Peace Tangle, 195-6
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theories agree that the Magyars came from central Asia.
The majority of writers contend that the Magyars are a
nation of Finnish origin, which only at a later period
1
.
came under the influence of the Turks and Slavs.
The first authentic movement, but apparently not
the first movement, was from the Black Sea to the Don
basin, which was occupied by people known as the Chazars.
The Magyars were finally expelled from here by the Patzi-
naks, but settled nearby, in territory inhabited by Slavs.
They spread beyond the Bug, Dniester, Pruth and Seret
Rivers, and occupied lands of southwestern Russia, Bes-
sarabia, and Moldavia, carrying on predatory raids.
T. Hunfalvy is the champion of this theory. "To Vambery
the language is not of such decisive weight as the social
life and civilization. The whole mode of living, the
first appearance in history, the political organization of
the Magyars, shew clearly that they belong in origin to
the Turco-Tartar races." Camb. Med. Hist . IV, 19^-195.
According to Vambery, even the names by which the Mag-
yars are called by foreigners are of importance. The By-
zantine and Arab-Persian writers call them "Turks." Vam-
bery is, therefore, inclined to believe that the Magyars
belonged originally to the Turco-Tartar peoples, and that
they in course of time adopted into their vocabulary Fin-
no-Ugrian words. Vambery. The Story of Hungary
. p .27 ff.
The ethnical blending of the two races began in times
so remote that it escapes historical observation. Wink-
ler found in the Magyar language a still greater mixture.
He thinks the Finnish foundation was influenced by the
Turkish, Mongol, Dravidiap, Iranian, and Caucasian lan-
guages. C .M.H
. IV, page 195.
Although Vambery’ s fundamental opinion may not be quite
correct, it can be observed that the cultural influence of
the Turks on these people was so great it changed their
mode of living, "and that from hunters they became a no-
madic people, one of the most warlike of nations." C .M.H.
IV, 195.
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The nomadic tendencies of the Magyars became less when
Geza, who was prince of the Magyars in the tenth century,
realized that his people were strong enough to hold out
against other nations if they would settle down in peace.
As an early step in his plan he welcomed the Bishop of
Prague who introduced Christianity. Geza's young son,
Vajk, took the name 'Stephen
1
in baptism. When the
Magyars finally settled, they occupied land formerly
controlled by the Huns. Because of this they were re-
1
.
f erred to as "Hungarians . M
The Magyars have long considered themselves to be
natural rulers- a fact which served as a continual
threat to their neighbors and enemies, and of material
2
.
benefit to their friends. Other nationalities came in
as these people settled down. Nevertheless, the Magyar
race developed an impetuous, fighting people, dominating
the less developed nationalities of the Hungarian king-
dom. "They governed the peoples and the territory com-
3.
prising the old Hungarian monarchy for a thousand years."
The Magyar domination in Hungary has allowed no innovations.
This has made reform difficult, and the usual rule has
been revolution rather than actual reform when any change
has been contemplated. This system of Magyar domination
1. Birinyi, Thet.Tragedy of Hungary . 7 . f.n.
2. Mowrer, Balkanized Europe . 187.
3. Bass, 190.
%
5had its beginning as early as the fourteenth century when
eight millions of Magyars were united under the Holy Hun-
garian Crown, a much stronger bond of union than the feu-
dal system of the West. Under Stephen its purpose was
the increase of royal power by rendering it as independent
as possible of restrictions on the part of the nation, and
the introduction of such institutions as would prove most
valuable in the defense of the integrity and unity of the
nation and the country. Stephen allowed the nobles to
pursue their ancient rights undisturbed when such rights
did not interfere with his own. He introduced an inno-
vation with regard to the tenure of their property, which
he changed from tribal to individual possession, using
his authority to protect each man in the possession of the
states thus allotted to him. The nobles exercised a great
deal of freedom among themselves- governed themselves,
administered justice among themselves through men of their
own selection, and the king interfered only if he was es-
pecially requested to do so. The nobility was exempted
from paying any kind of taxes into the royal treasury,
and joined the king's army only if the country was menaced
by a foreign foe, or if they chose to offer their services
of their own free will. Stephen controlled large domains
to offset the power which the nobles exercised in their
1
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freeholdings . He acquired much of the public domain
from vast tracts of unowned land scattered over the
realm and around the frontiers. These areas were very
often occupied by foreigners, and the King declared their
land state property when he wished to take possession.
He divided these pieces of territory into small domains
called counties or circuits, and placed an official at
the head of each division with the title of Count. The
people of one-half of this territory paid taxes in pro-
duce, and the other half paid in military service to the
King. Thus, a standing army was at his disposal on de-
mand.
While Hungary’s land system was developing, other
events were occurring which illustrate the height to
which Hungary arose culturally. The University of Pecs
was founded by Louis the Great; the world-famed Corvina
Library at Pozony University was the contribution of
King Matthew Corvinus.
The fourteenth and fifteenth century were filled
with attacks on the Magyars by the Turks. The invasions
continued even after the House of Jagellon occupied the
1
.
throne. When Louis II of the House of Jagellon died,
1. King Louis was drowned in escaping across a brook near
the Danube. The Sultan advanced at this time and took
Suda, btit not permanently. He was not yet prepared to
annex Hungary on account of demoralized conditions of
his army and difficulties arising at home. Camb. Med. Hist
.
I, 97.
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7the country split into two factions- one supporting the
Hapsburg family, the candidate being Ferdinand, brother of
Charles V, Emperor; and the other selecting John Szapolyi,
a powerful magnate of the country* The Hapsburg faction
won <6u^?. For a century and a half the only unity in the
country was fighting against the common enemy. The
Hapsburgs succeeded in ruling only the northern and wes-
tern sections of the country. The fertile plain and
river district , were— -more thickly populated with people
of pure Magyar blood, ^his was the section more com-
pletely controlled by the Turks. The third section (the
eastern mountain land), became the independent Hungarian
principality of Transylvania, the stronghold of national
Hungarian rule. By the end of the seventeenth century
Transylvania had been united again to the Hungarian
Crown, the Turks had evacuated or were driven from most
of Hungary, and that kingdom had been subjected to the
1
.
Hapsburgs. The Hapsburgs continued toodo everything
within their power to stunt the growth of the Hungarians.
They encouraged the coming of the Germans, the Serbs,
and many other nationalities whom the natives did not
want . The Magyars realized that such a program would
weaken themselves, and they also realized that this was
1. C ,M*H . 1,99.
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the purpose for which the Hapsburgs had embarked on
this program. Many nationalities date their oresence in
1
.
Hungary from this period. The Germans inhabited the
territory bordering on the Austrian crownlands, Slovaks
bordering on Bohemia and Moravia, Jugoslavs south of the
2
.
Drave, and Rumanians in Transylvania.
Relations between Austria and Hungary were becom-
ing more clearly defined. By the Pragmatic Sanction of
1723, Hungary and the Austrian provinces were declared
Inseparable, and the ruler of both was to be the same
person- a member of the Hapsburg family, in regular or-
der of succession in the male and female lines. Other
than this, however, Hungary was to remain independent,
and was to be governed by her own laws. After the re-
volution of 1848, Hungary reorganized her government on
a broader constitutional basis- on the principles of
liberty, fraternity, and equality. The government was
vested in a ministry responsible to the parliament, all
the inhabitants were declared equal before the lav/, and
the privileges of the nobility were abolished, soil declar-
ed free, and the right of free worship was accorded to
3 .
all. National guards were formed, freedom of the press
1. Buday, Dismembered Hungary . 9. estimates that of
the different nationalities represented within Hungary
date their presence as early as this period.
2. Graham, New Governments of Central Europe . 110.
3* "All*
1
meant all Magyar stock. Graham, 115. "In Hun-
gary, the theory of responsible government was transla-
ted into a concrete fact, but all other than the Mag-
yar were practically deprived of political power."
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secured, and Transylvania again became a part of the
mother country.
In order to understand the part Hungary has played in
the political situation of Europe, it is necessary to
study the relations between Austria and Hungary. Fol-
lowing the revolution of 1848 in Hungary, Austria in-
augurated a state of siege on Hungary which she did not
lift for five years, and it was 1857 before amnesty was
granted. In that year the Emperor visited Hungary, and
seemed anxious to heal the wouftds that had been inflic-
ted in 1849. Four years later the old constitution was
restored to Hungary, and the possibility of a deeper
friendship between Austria and Hungary looked promising.
From 1867 to the World War, relations became more
settled. The Hapsburg family at last realized after
failure in Italy and Prussia, that the strongest section
of their realm was Hungary. In 1867 the union between
Austria and Hungary was consummated. Hungary did not
become a part of Austria. She remained a separate king-
dom. The agreement dealt only with foreign relations,
military and naval affairs when connected with common
defense, and finances when the two nations had a problem
1 .
in common. The Dual Monarchy was the result of negotia-
1 . C lark
,
Old Home3 and New Americans. 3
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tions between Francis Deak, the leader of Hungarian li-
beralism, and Baron Beust, Chancellor of Austria. "it
raised Hungary from the plane of a dependency, or an or-
dinary province, to a status well-nigh approximating in-
dependence. By establishing certain joint organs of
government, it enabled the hitherto conglomerate crownlands
to be divided into the two halves of the new structure.
The lands of the Austrian Crown were permitted to have
their own internal administration, as were those of Hun-
gary, but for Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance, Joint Min-
pi^tries were created, responsible to no parliament for
their actions, but onlv to the person of the Emperor
-
1
.
King.” A joint parliament was created in the form of
Delegations, bodies of sixty representatives from the
parliament of each country, forty being chosen by the
Lower House and twenty by the Upper House in each ins-
tance. In these bodies German and ilagyar were the of-
ficial languages. When in joint session only an equal
number of members could participate in voting. Each
language was equally valid. Although Austria intended to
dominate the situation, in practice Hungary was the
stronger. Her representatives were solidly agyar, and
therefore had a concerted policy, which was hardly pos-
1. Graham, 113
.’
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sible among the polyglot representation of Austria.
Hungary’s interests were solidly Magyar. The county was
the unit for local government and administration. Yet
these units were controlled by the Magyar landlords and
highest taxpayers. The non-Magyar elements were excluded
from participation in political life, and were left to
shift for themselves. Within the Hungarian |ter liament
the Magyars divided into definitely organized parties.
The most important, and the one in power at the outbreak
of the World War, was the National Party of Work. It
stood firmly for the "union of a close economic and
political affiliation with Austria, and -was the defender
1
.
of the interests of the agrarian Magnates.” Opposed
to this Calvinistic group was the Popular Catholic
Party, which stood for the interests on the non-Magyar
population. The Constitutionalist Party, led by An-
drassy and Batthyanyi, ardently defended the Triple Al-
liance^and Hungarian cooperation with Germany to weaken
Austrian power in Hungary. The Party of Independence
and of 1848 recognized only a personal union between
the Austrian and Hungarian States and demanded complete
economic separation from Austria. At the outbreak of
the War, the majority of this party were led by Count
>
1. Graham, 116-117
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Apponyi, remaining faithful to the ideal of the alliance
with Germany. The moreddemocratic element, led by Count
Karolyi, formed the Karolyi Party. It stood for univer-
sal suffrage, separate Hungarian army, and immediate
agrarian reforms. It opposed economic or military agree-
ments which would bind the country with Germany.
Hungary's more recent history has been influenced
by her political position among the States and PowerB of
Europe and by her foreign policy. For years a pan-Slav
movement was developing. During the Balkan Wars of 1912
and 1913, the Serbs, in carrying out their plans for a
"Greater Serbia," enlarged theirlterritory somewhat at
1
.
Austria’s expense. The Serbian program was encouraged by
Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade. It is reported
that he told his Rumanian colleague that Serbia "could
not possibly renounce her outlet on the Adriatic ; Serbia
must be the Slavic advance-post in the Balkans, and
must annex Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the South Slav dis-
tricts of Hungary; Rumania, he hinted, had better look out
2
.
for her interests in the same way and annex Transylvania."
Although Sazanov denied that Hartwig could have made such
a statement, it is generally conceded that "Russia was
energetically supporting the Serbian claim to Northern
1. Fay, The Origins of the War . I, 439.
2. Ibid, I, 439.
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Albania and ports on the Adriatic, Reports came from
St, Petersburg that the Pan-Slav and militarist party
i of the Grand Dukes was using pressure upon the Tsar to
F
1.
resort to war, if necessary, on Serbia's behalf,"
Austria and Italy were not pleased at Serbia's victor-
ies, Likewise, the Albanians did not rejoice at the
prospect of Serbian rule in place of urkish. Austria
and Jtaly both urged the establishment of an Albanian
State, though for different reasons. They both agreed
in their motive of excluding Serbia from the Adriatic,
but both wanted to dominate that territory themselves.
Italy favored a weak Albania so that she herself might
develop more strength in the Adriatic. In the Albanian
question, Russia backed up the Serbs in the policy of
actually possessing Northern Albania. Austria and
Italy were determined to support the Albanian leaders in
their opposition to Serbia. Russia began to mobilize
part of her forces against Austria, who in turn had al-
2
.
ready started preparations for war against Serbia.
Russia did not continue her action when war became im-
minent. Poincare
7
of France, however, encouraged Russia
to uhhold Serbia. " He saw that the new Balkan Alliance
was virtually equivalent in strength to a Great Power.
) With this on the side of Russia, the prospects were
1.
Fay, I ,440.
2. It was believed that Austria had mobilized three army
corps in Galicia against Russia. Fay, I, 442,
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highly favorable for French revanche, if Austria should
attack Russia, and thus involve France and Germany in a
general war. He counted on Italy's doubtful loyalty to the
Triple Alliance, and he hoped for England's armed support
1 .
to the Triple Entente." Concessions were made on all
sides in this crisis, however, and peace was preserved.
The London Conference of Ambassadors accepted Sir Edward
Grey's compromise proposal for an independent Albania.
Unfortunately neither of the two countries intimately in-
terested were satisfied. Serbia felt very bitterly at
being deprived of her economic outlet bn the Adriatic .
Austria felt that she did not get the support she should
have had because the majority of the Conference took
sides against her. She was dissatisfied with the boun-
dary lines of Albania.
Although the Albanian settlement prevented immedi-
ate war between the Great Powers, it remained a source
of friction until the outbreak of the World War.
Serbia had made great strides toward accomplishing a
"Greater Serbia" by the close of the Second Balkan War.
By her acquisition of part of Novi Bazar and the Upper
Vardar valley, and her running frontier with Montenegro,
she would effectively bar Austria's progress toward Sa-
1. Fay, I, 442-443
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loniki. To be sure, Austria had lost no territory,
nor had she taken part in the Balkan Wars. Nevertheless,
she felt weakened in power and prestige as Serbia gr ew
stronger, Austria's subject-nationalities grew more
restless. Austria continued to distrust Italy more and
more. The situation was again becoming ominous. The
Second Balkan War was localized because of Bethmann's
warning to Berchtold on July 6. Berchtold was becoming
nervous for fear that Rumania was about to fall upon
Bulgaria and so weaken her that Serbian danger would
become greater than ever. He advised the officials at
Bucharest to keep Rumania from advancing on Bulgaria.
Bethmann refused to comply because he thought the way to
hold Rumania in position was for Austria to exert pres-
sure at Sofia to induce King Ferdinand to satisfy King
Carol’s justifiable demands for territorial compensa-
tions. He further communicated to Berchtold that
"Austria-Hungary from the outset declared that in the
present Balkan crisis she is striving after no territori-
al conquests. She has defined her interest as to the
outcome of the Balkan War to the effect that Serbia must
not reach the Adriatic, and that a viable Albania must
be delivered. The first point she has smoothly accom-
plished. As to the boundaries of Albania, she has
,,
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triumphed in the Scutari question, and along with Italy
also in the question of the southern boundary of Albania
along the coast. The questions still open- the southern
boundary on the mainland, the constitution, and the
choice of a ruler, etc., (sic) will, it is to be hoped,
be satisfactorily settled. At any rate the hostilities
which have broken out between Bulgaria and Serbia-Gr eece
in no wise disturb as yet the rule of policy hitherto
traced by Austria- Hungary. How the present hostili-
ties between Bulgaria and Serbia will end, no man knows. --
Austria-Hungary should not interfere with this result.
Even if Serbia should win, it is still a long way to a
Great Serbia. For even then, Serbia will not reach the
Adriatic, and a few strips of land more or less will not
put the fat in the fire. Should Austria-Hungary now try
by diplomatic means to chase Serbia out of her newly-won
territories, she would have no luck, but would certainly
arouse deadly hatred in Serbia. Should she try to do this
by force of arms, it would mean a European war. I can
therefore only express the hope that the people of Vien-
na will not let themselves be upset by the nightmare of
a Great Serbia, but will await further developments from
the Serbo -Bulgarian theatre of war. Only insistently can
I warn against the idea of wanting to gobble up Serbia,
,-
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for that would simply weaken Austria.' 4
On the same date that Bethmann sent the words of
I warning to Berchtold, Count Tisza, the Magkr leader,
y A
became Minister-President of Hungary. Although he recog-
nized the Serbian danger, and believed that the London
Conference had been of no advantage to Austria-Hungary,
he was inclined to strike out on an independent diplomatic
policy for Austria-Hungary. Berchtold had no definite
policy, although he continued to inform Germany that
Albania's existence was necessary as a barrier against
the Slav advance to the driatic, and hoped that Ger-
many would stand firmly in back of Austria in "damming the
Slav flood
;
"becud?se as far as he could see, it would be
only a question of moral support, since neither Russia
nor France wanted war , " The Berlin Foreign Office assured
Berchtold of the moral support, and instructed Germany's
diplomatic agents to back up Austria's efforts in pre-
serving the life of Albania. It also urged that Sir
Edward Grey use his influence at Belgrade and the London
Conference to see that the decisions of the Powers were
respected. If not, Austria might pursue her program
independently. Grey was out of town during this de-
velopment, and his Under-Secretary believed that Grey
>
1. Fay, I, 451-452. Requoted from Bethmann to SzByenyi.
and Zimmermann to Tshirschky, July 6, 1913. G.P.XXXV,
129 f.
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would not favor as drastic action as an ultimatum from
Austria to Serbia for evacuation. Neverthless, October
•17, Berchtold sent an ultimatum in the middle of the night
to Belgrade, on the strength of the support of Germany.
It insisted that Serbia « respect Albanian territory and
withdraw her troops within eight days. Otherwise,
Austria would be obliged to use force. Serbia decided
at once to yield, and gave orders for her troops to evacu-
ate the occupied Albanian territory, not, however, be-
cause Austria had brought pressure, but because she re-
garded the friendly advice of Russia as valuable. Austria
found that by acting quickly and independently she had
accomolished what3She wanted- a dangerous precedent to
the peace of Europe.
- The real Balkan problem was that the subject-nation-
alities of the decaying Ottoman Empire were beginning
to make their desires for political freedom and national
unity a reality. However, many of these peoples were
still under Turkish or Hapsburg rule, and could succeed
in their ambitions only by a more complete disintegra-
tion of Turkey, and the partial dismemberment of Austria-
Hungary. Austria had to preserve her very existence as
a State; Serbia to satisfy ambitions of political liberty
and national unity. Each, in carrying out its program,
..
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came in conflict with the other.
As Turkey declined in power jealousy between Russia
and Austria over their respective influences in the Bal-
kans became more intense. Russia aoparently urged Serbia
to realize her policy of a "Greater Serbia." With Rus-
sia's assistance, Serbia could achieve this ambition at
Austria’s expense. Serbia was to wait until Russia was
ready, however. Already alliances and loyalties were
1
.
becoming firm.
Because of the events of 1912 and 1913, suspicion
among the Great European Powers, ( especially England and
Germany) and the Balkan States themselves. This resulted
in an increase of armaments. Tenseness and distrust were
particularly evident in Austria and Serbia. Serbia had
been thwarted in her Adriatic policy, but compensated
for this by friendship with Macedonia. This brought about
the hatred of Bulgaria. Therefore, Serbia tightened her
relations with Greece and Rumania with the assistance of
Russia. The Rumanians were ready to embark on a "Great-
er Rumania" policy, but would cast their lot with the
2
.
side from whom they could get the greatest concessions.
In the spring of 1914 Russia was seeking the friend-
ship of Rumania. 3he wanted to build up a strong Balkan
1. Fay, I, 543.
2. Ibid, I, 544.
..
- d&w ’ ,v
.
.
.
.
0 V ! t
.
.
.
t
• 4. i
.
.
.
,
'
• ^
.
,
•
bloc under her power. The bloc was to include also
Serbia and Greece. Austria was developing a counter-
bloc with Bulgaria and Turkey as a nucleus.
As these alliances and understandings were growing
in the Balkans, a friendship which was to be of great
significance was growing between Austria and Germany.
The archduke Ferdinand had married a lady-in-waiting
in the Austrian Court. This very much displeased his
uncle, the Fmperor, although he accepted it as a mor-
ganatic union. Countess Chotek was raised to the rank of
Duchess of Hohenberg. Neverthless, Vienna rebuffed the
Duchess. However, the Kaiser once invited the Archduke
and Archduchess to visit him at Potsdam, where the Arch-
duchess was received with all the honors due her as the
1
.
Archduke's wife. From this incident, the Archduke and the
Kaiser became very friendly. In June, 1914, the Kaiser
went to Franz Ferdinand's beautiful villa at Konopischt
in Bohemia, ostensibly to see the Archduke's beautiful
gardens. Admiral von Tirpltz and the Austrian Foreign
Minister , Berchtold, accompanied the Kaiser. Important
discussions of internal Austrian politics took place.
Among them was the problem of Tisza's treatment of the
Rumanians in Transylvania and its dangerous effect upon
1. Fay, 20, ff.
..
.
.
-
.
,
«
.
.
so-, zi
public feeling in the Kingdom of Rumania. It was felt
that Tisza's domination of Hungary was developing in-
o
his domination of Austria as well. This situation had
probably arisen from the fact that Austria-Hungary was
generally represented at Berlin by an Hungarian Ambas-
sador, and it resulted in the Berlin Foreign Office being
"too inclined to 14ok at conditions in Austr ia-Hungarv
1 .
through Hungarian spectacles." Von Tirpitz was present
at the conference prdably to lend his advice in the
upbuilding and reorganizing of the Austrian navy, and
to interpret the rumored navy agreements between France
and Russia (of 1912) and Russia and England, then under
discussion. The most important result was, however,
that the Kaiser was becoming a better personal friend to
Franz Ferdinand, and when Franz was assassinated a few
days later, the Kaiser became more extravagant with his
instructions to Berchtold to express sympathy for his
flrend's fateful ending. The Kaiser had been restrain-
ing Austria from acting against Serbia, but the "roses
1
.
of Konopischt" were so vivid in the Kaiser's mind
that he was willing to change his policy.
The intrigues about the assassination of the Arch-
duke may or may not all be known at the present time.
Certain it is that the general public have not had ac-
cess to the information. It is believed, however, that the
1. Fay, 11,43.
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Archduke’s trip through Bosnia was for the purpose of
military inspection, and he went as a duty. Evidence
1
.
has been brought to light by Stanoje Stanovevitch
that a leader of one of the less well-known Serbian se-
2
.
cret revolutionary societies was responsible. Stano-
Jevitch also claims that the Chief of the Intelligence
Department of the Serbian General Staff, Colonel Dragutin
Dimitri jevitch, organized this plot in Belgrade. M hen
Dimitri Jevitch headd, in addition to other rmors, that
A
the Austrian archduke was coming to hold military man-
oeuvres in Bosnia, * he was thoroughly convinced that
Austria-Hungary intended to carry out an attack upon
Serbia, ' and, 'after long consideration came to the con-
clusion that the attack on Serbia could only be prevented
by killing Franz Ferdinand.*” 3. From an account by M.
Ljuba Jovanovitch, Minister of Education in the Pashitch
Cabinet in July, 1914, it is evident that the Serbian Govern
ment knew of the plot a month previous, and did nothing
effective to prevent the murder, which places criminal ne-
gligence on the Serbian Government* The Government nei-
ther published the rumors, nor investigated them; and
4
•
after the event, attempted to conceal every trace of it.
1. Stanoje Stano jevitch. ”Ubistvo Austriskog Prestolo-
naslednika Ferdlnanda "-The Murder of the Austrian Heir to
the Throne Ferdinand . Belgrade, 1923.
2. Fay, II, 57-8.
3. Ibid, II, 60.
4. Ibid, 11,61-3.
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Jovanovitch expected that a European crisis would result.
1
.
Russia would not back down at that stage. Some deny the
truth of Jovanovitch* s statements, among them, Seton-
Watson. They deny also that Pashitch, who was a member of
the "Black Hand", knew of the plot. It is known, however,
that the policy of the "Black Hand" as of the Radical
Party since the sixties and seventies of the previous
century was to keep discontent alive in the Serbian dis-
tricts of the Turkish and Hapsburg Empires until the
future war of liberation should ioin them to a Greater
2
.
Serbia. There was an internal conflict between the
Pashitch radicals and the "Black Hand" military officers
over the Dolicy of extending the Serbain constitution to
^ 3.
conquered territories in Piedmont in 1912. Fay claims
that this is proof enough that the Pashitch wing were not
in the plot. Jovanovitch warned the Austrian Government
unofficially and irregularly of the danger, referring
to the plot only as a possible danger of disloyalty among
4 •
the troops. This warning is not sufficient to relieve
the Serbian Government of the guilt for withholding the
information which they possessed.
Contrary to Berchtold's usual hesitancy and indeci-
sion, he decided to use the assassination of Franz Fer-
I§6
1. Fay, 11,64.
2. Ibid, 11,77-78.
3. Ibid, 11,145.
4. Ibid, 11,166.
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dinand and his wife as an excuse to clear up the situa-
tion between Austria and Serbia and to crush the Greater
Serbia and Russian intrigues against Austria. Conrad,
the Chief of Staff at Vienna, summed up the situation
by stating that Austria-Hungary had to draw the sword a-
gainst Serbia unless she was to allow herself to disin-
tegrate. "it was not a question of a knightly duel
with 'poor little' Serbia, nor of punishment for the
assassination. It was much more the highly practical
importance of the prestige of a Great Power which, by
its continual yielding and patience— had given an im-
pression of impotence and made its external and internal
enemies continually more aggressive, so that these enem-
ies were working with increasingly aggressive means for
1
.
the destruction of the Old Empire." Conrad, convinced
that Austria must make war on Serbia, as an act of self-
preservation, urged Berchtold to approve immediate mobili-
zation against Serbia. Berchtold had objections because
he felt that public opinion must be prepared; the grounds
of war must be established as a result of the catastrophe
at Sarajevo; Francis Joseph was opposed to any war a-
gainst Serbia; and Tisza "opposed to any war against
Serbia, fearing that Russia would attack Austria and that
1. Fay, 11,185-186.
-.
,
_
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Germany and Rumania would leave her in the lurch.”
Berchtold immediately began working on a program to over-
come these obstacles, however, and set the scene for an
2
.
"immediate local war against Serbia." Tisza believed
that war wouldbbe a fatal mistake atthis time, and that
Austria would be accused of disturbing the peace of the
world. He believed that peace should be preserved in
the Balkans, and that Austria should win the friendship of
Bulgaria. He believed that "the crux of the European si-
tuation lay in the Balkans and particularly in attaching
Bulgaria to the Central Powers. This was of just as
much vital interest to Germany as to Austria. Therefore,
the Dual Monarchy should strive to oppose Russia’s Bal-
kan policy. The best way to win Bulgaria was to
hold out to Ferdinand the prospect of acquiring Macedonia.
This could be acc omplishedjonly when Bulgaria had re-
covered herself. Meanwhile the Central Powers must
assure Bulgaria protection against attack from Turkey
or Greece. Rumanian public feeling was very strong
against Hungary, but an effort was made to keep King Carol
firm in allaihce and assure him that Rumania was in no
danger of an attack from Bulgaria. Germany and Aus f ria
must henceforth cooperate together to effect a favorable
grouping of the Balkan States; Rumania and Greece must
1. Pay, II, 187.
2. Ibid, II, 189
,.
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be wooed away from Serbia, and reconciled with Bul-
garia on the basis of an enlargement of Bulgaria at
1 .
Serbia’s expense,"
Russia and France had been pursuing a policy whereby
they were buildins up a new Balkan League aimed at the
territorial dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy. To
thwart this, Tisza suggested an alliance with Bulgaria
,
2
.
and Berchtold even suggested it to include Turkey.
By the Sarajevo incident, Berchtold was converted
to Conrad's idea of immediate war on Serbia. The Kaiser's
attitude must have been influenced by the fact that a
personal friend of his had been killed. According to
Sz8dhyeny
,
"Austria must Judge what is to be done to
clear up her relations to Serbia; whatever Austria’s de-
cision may turn out to be, Austria can count with cer-
tainty upon it, that Germany will stand behind her as
3.
an ally and friend." In order to win over Tisza, Berch-
told tried to make Tisza think that Germany wanted war.
Tisza said that this affair was no concern of Germany,
and was willing to make certain demands on Serbia. "A
note in moderate, but not threatening, language, should
be addressed to Serbia, which should set forth our speci-
fic grievances and our precise demands in connection with
1. Fay, 11,188.
2. Ibid, II, 195-6
3. Ibid, II, 223.
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them.--- Should Serbia give an unsatisfactory answer
and try dilatory tactics, an ultimatum should follow, and
1
.
after expiration, the opening of hostilities." How-
ever, Tisza finally changed his attitude after a minis-
terial council was held. The chairman, Berchtold, opened
the session by reiterating Germany's support, and said
that the moment had come for a demonstration of power
that would put an end to the Serbian intrigues once for
2
.
all, "and stop tendencies that were now in full swing."
It was clear to him that war with Russia would be very
3.
probable if Serbia was attacked. Berchtold' s ideas
met with general approval, except from Tisza. All
present, except the Royal Hungarian Minister, thought
that a purely diplomatic success, even if it ended with
a resounding humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless,
and that, therefore, such far-reaching demands must be
made on Serbia as would make refusal certain, so that -the
way would be open for a drastic solution by means of mi-
4 •
litary action." Tisza felt that as Hungarian Minister
he could never consent to the Monarchy's annaxing any
part of Serbia. He was still resisting Berchtold 's poli-
cy, but had somewhat modified his own position since
July 1. He made it clear that he was willing to meet
1. Fay, II, 233.
2. Schmitt, B. The Coming of the #ar 1914 .1.344.
3. Ibid, 1 , 345 .footnote
.
4. Ibid, I, 346.
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the others half-way, and Insisted now only that ”
1
the
demands be addressed to Serbia were not to be such that
our intention of making them unacceptable conditions
1
.
should be clearly perceived.'" Berchtold adopted this
middle courser:, drawing up demands which he knew Serbia ^
would not accept, however, The program was, in brief,
that Austria demanded punishment and expulsion of the
Serbian military officers involved in the Greater- Serbian
propaganda; apology of the Serbian Government for lan-
guage of the Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg; in-
vestigation on procuring the bombs; dismissal of certain
Serbian officials connected with the Pokragats incident^
(the Archduke going to Bosnia); passing of a new press law;
revision of Serbia law relating to political societies;
prohibition of distribution of journals hostile to Austria-
2
.
Hungary in offices, clubs, and public establishments.
Francis Joseph thought this action too drastic, al-
though he thought some concrete demands should be made
on Serbia. This was a much more war-like attitude than
the Emperor had had formerly, and was due to the backing
of Germany, no doubt. On July 14, Tisza finally consent-
ed. The reason for his change is conjecture, but may be
explained by the fact that the Emperor had paid no at-
1. Schmitt, I, 346-7.
2. Program taken from Schmitt, I, footnote, page 347,
requoted from Gooss, p. 93, note 1.
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tention to Tisza's communications; he felt that if war
was to come eventually, the case would he weakened by
1
.
waiting; and Germany's sympathetic attitude.
It is not easy to take a fair and unprejudiced
view of the Austro-Hungarian policy. The rulers of
the Dual Monarchy appear to have believed in all sincerity
that the integrity of their State was threatened by the
propaganda being released from Belgrade, and "they saw
behind it, if not as the driving force, at least as the
stalwart support, the mighty power of Russia. Theyif
rightly regarded the Serbo-Russian ambitions as fatal
to the very existence of the Monarchy, and they would have
been less than human had they not determined to prevent,
if possible, the realization of these ambitions. To
meet the serious provocation contained in the mind of
the heir apparent to the throne, prompt and effective
measures were necessary and justifiable; and the failure
to establish the complicity of the Serbian Government in
2
.
the Sarajevo crime did not seem a valid reason against
proceeding wither promptly or vigorously. To seize the
opportunity for dealing with the Serbs, was, no reason-
able person will deny, not only intelligible, it was
3.
natural.
"
1. Schmitt, I, 34-8-34-9
.
2. Dr. Friedrich Ritter von Wiesner, one of the legal ex-
perts of the foreign office, was sent to Sarajevo on July
10 to investigate. He could not find any proof for action
against the Serbian Government, although he declared he
was reasonably sure of their comlicity. Schmitt, I, f.n. 312.
3. Schmitt, 1,373.
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There is another side of this situation to examine.
Though Austria-Hungary could rightfully fear the pan -Slav
^
movement, she seems never to have comprehended that the
hostility of Serbia and the unrest in the South-Slav pro-
vinces were in a large part the natural consequence of
their own form of foreign and domestic policy. If Serbia
had provoked Austria-Hungary, certainly Austria-Hungary
had in various ways and at various times helped complicate
the situation. The ultimate aim of the Hapsburgs was
1
.
destruction of Serbian independence. Austria-Hungary
was really a worn-out political entity, hopelessly torn
by internal feuds and threatened by serious external
dangers, yet it still existed as a great power. Schmitt
says that for this reason, to preserve herself, she was
justified in demanding from Serbia some satisfaction
for the Sarajevo incident; but that the Austrians lost
2
.
the sense of the proportion of the crime. It is
true that any Power has the right to demand explana-
tions, and to have let this incident pass, unchallenged,
would have been outward manifestation of the decadence
of the Austria Empire which the Austrians were strug-
gling against. The Government realized that to invade
Serbia would probably bring on a European crisis. They
>
1. Schmitt, 1,373.
2. Schmitt, 1,374.
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wilfully plotted to draw Serbia into a conflict, and
therein lies Austria's chief responsibility for the
War. The German Government, informed of the progress,
offered no objections, which further encouraged Austria.
The Serbs were evasive in their reply, but considered they
had made a favorable Cine. In spite of this, Austria con-
tinued to prepare for war. Berchtold refused compro-
mises, and public osychology had been educated to "not
1 .
whether there should be war, but when?" Mobilization
began. Russia did not want Serbia crushed
,
and so, she,
too mobilized.
Diplomatists were, then, very much to blame for the
situation becoming as far-reaching as it did. Public
opinion was also a cause for not averting war at this
time. Newspapers urged a resolute stand and opposed con-
2
.
cessions
.
The Hungarian Government could not stem the tide. The
result was that on October 31, 1918, the internal order
collapsed. A revolution had taken place, which was for
the purpose of establishing a Republic. On November
13, Charles issued a letter of abdication. On November
16, Hungary was declared "the Hungarian' People' s Repub-
lic." The provisional president was Count Michael Karol-
yi. The two houses of the legislature were abolished, and
1. Schmitt, 11,77.
2. Schmitt, II, 481.
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replaced by the Provisional National Council, This gov-
ernment continued until March, 1919. On March 21, a
dictatorship of the proletariat was proclaimed. With
the assistance of the Rumanian army, the Soviet govern-
ment was wiped out. August 7- found the National Govern
ment again established. January and February (1920)
elections were held on the basis of universal suffrage.
The Parliament of 1920 considered the Revolution of 1918
and the Revolution of 1919 as de Jure a blank space of
time, and resolved that the old monarchical institutions
should be continued. Hungary was a monarchy with a
vacant throne, the work of the monarch done by a "re-
gent." On March 1, the Parliament elected Nicholas
Horthy de "agybsnya to this office, by a vote of one hun
dred and thirty-one as against seven for Count Apponyi
.
On March 23, Horthy issued an order which formally
made Hungary a monarchy, and the ministry was to be
named the "Royal Hungarian Ministry." Then Horthy
dropped the title of Governor, and became "Administra-
tor of the Realm." ’While the formation of parties ac-
cording to the various positions on the Constitution
was taking place, King Karl returned from Switzerland.
He demanded the throne of Horthy, but Horthy refused be-
cause of his oath to the National Assembly. Horthy and

33 .
Teleki, who was Prime Minister, obtained a safe conduct
passage from Karl throu Austria, and finally prevailed
upon him to leave the country. Teleki published a final
message of Karl’s to the people without the knowledge of
1
.
the other ministers, which discredited him, and hewas
forced to resign. Stephen Bethlen then assumed Premier-
2
.
ship
.
Bethlen attempted to create a strong middle class
capable of withstanding revolutionary efforts. In
his opinion, true democracy meant the exclusion of the
incompetent and privileged. Kis program included elec-
toral reform, administrative overhauling, and the
creation of a second chamber. Finally, the Treaty of
Trianon provided for the reorganization of the army, and
this was to be his guide. The Treaty had been negotia-
ted by the former ministry, but nevertheless was binding.
When Bethlen formed the new Cabinet, he pledged
the exertion of every effort to guarantee that the Haps-
burg dynasty would not be restored, and to free Hungary
3 .
from intervention by the Little Entente. Since Hungary has
been admitted to the League of Nations, his policy has
been somewhat successful. The League has recognized
Hungary's pacific intentions. By her membership, Hungary
pledged herself to refrain from aggression toward her
1. Graham, 570.
2. April 15, 1921.
3. The Little Entente was formed to combat the come-back
pf a powerful Hungary. A more lengthy discussion of the
Little Entente will be found in this report in the dis-
cussion of Article 53.
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neighbors, and has had to limit her own activities.
At the time when the Treaty of Trianon became
effective there were two lines of activity upon which the
Hungarian Government had to work. The internal, which
very much needed reform, consisted mainly of determin-
ing the defin'te form of the state, adopting a constitu-
tion, and guaranteeing individual rights. The interna-
tional problem is bound up in the Treaty of Trianon
and the status that Hungary is to be given in the family
of nations. The revolution of 1918 was simply a visual
manifestation that the Dual Monarchy had disintegrated.
Since that time, Hungary has been trying to regain her
equilibrium, but the ineffectiveness with which her
internal and international problems have been met, has
made the task doubly hard.
(c
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III. The Treaty
a. Circumstances under which the treaty was drawn up-
(l) Background for terms-
On November 1, 1918, the Austro-Hungarian delegates
met at Villa Giusti, near Padua in Italy, for the purpose
of drawing up an armistice with Italy. A document was
signed on November 3, between the Italian generals Diaz
and Badoglio and the Austro-Hungarian delegation. Ac-
cording to the agreement, a line was drawn which cut off
the southwest section of the Empire; in all other direc-
tions the old political frontiers remained unchanged.
Karolyi, one of the Hungarian delegates, believed that
more favorable terms could be obtained from the Entente.
He hastened to Belgrade where he met General Franchet
d’Esperey, a Frenchman who had the power to act for the
Entente forces. On November 13, a separate agreement
was made between Karolyi and d’Esperey. This convention
was far less favorable to the Hungarians than the Italian
convention had been, for the frontiers shrank in prac-
tically every direction to a considerable extent. Hun-
.-
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garian troops were required to confine themselves and
their activity within the limitations of their own
territory as set down in the convention signed at
Belgrade, but Hungarian rule was to continue to func-
tion in the evacuated regions. It is alleged that
almost immediately after this agreement had been
signed, it was broken. Hungarian officials were removed,
Hungarian police were disarmed, communications inter-
rupted, and the inhabitants forced to take oaths of
allegiance to the country to which that territory had
had assigned- Jugoslavia, Rumania, or Czechoslovakia,
according to the location. They were even pressed into
1 .
the service of these countries, according to reports.
About the same time as the Belgrade Convention, of-
ficial reports came of the fall of the Dual Monarchy, and
2
.
of the abdication of Emperor Charles. Such was the
setting for the final peace treaty.
(2) Steps toward the final form of the Treaty-
The text of the Treaty of Trianon was received by
the Hungarian Government on January 15, 1920, with the
request that it be signed or a reply be given within
fifteen days. Immediately hostile feeling was apparent, and
1. Powell, Embattled Borders . 126 and 127.
2. N.Y.Times, March 13, 1920,2:2.
..
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fiery comments appeared in the newspapers. Hungary’s
military representatives at Neuilly registered their
views that the military clauses were not acceptable.
An army of thirty-five thousand was insufficient to main-
tain order in the interior with the condition of the
country as it then was, or to protect the country against
Bolshevism and insure the execution of the obligations
which the Allies had demanded. Hungary asked for more
time to sign. She was granted till February 12. Dis-
satisfaction continued to such an extent that a new treaty
was drafted in March, in which various economic con9
cessions were granted, though the territories remained
the same. Count Apponyi called the treaty only tempor-
1
.
ary, and said that the Hungarians would refuse to sign
2
.
unless there were plebiscites in the detached areas.
When the revised form of the treaty v/as sent, the dele-
gates were given ten days in which to sign. "Hungary’s
3.
last chance," the Allies warned. On May 12 it was ru-
4.
mored that Hungary was likely not to sign. Hungary still
wanted Flume, an army of more than thirty-five thousand,
and plebiscites held in the detached areas. Count Apponyi
v/as in favor of having the treaty revised under the direc-
tion of the League of Nations. ”.H. Hegegues, Hungarian
1. N.Y.Times, Anril 4, 1920.11,1:5.
2. Ibid April 11, 1920.14:2.
3. Ibid May 6, 1920,5 :1. By Special Cable the dele-
gates were notified they had only ten days in which to sign.
3. Ibid May 10, 1920.17:6.
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financial expert, said that Hungary could not meet the
financial demands the Allies were making on her because
of the extent to which her borders and resources had been
limited. The refusal of the Peace Conferees to grant
changes in the Hungarian treaty caused excitement. On
May 17, howeber, Budapest decided to accept, in conse-
quence of which Count Apponyi resigned. The new peace
delegation consisted chiefly of State Officials, as
Hungarian politic ials were anxious to avoid the odium
of signing the treaty. When Hungary finally decided to
sign the treaty, gloom pervaded the city. Count Paul
Teleki left Budapest, ay 30, for Paris, to join the
1 .
Hungarian Peace Delegation. The ceremony took place in
the Grand Trianon at Versailles Palace, a matter of less
than half an hour. Those who actually signed for Hun-
gary were A. Benard and Drasche Lazar.
b. Purpose of the Terms
-
Hungary was a defeated nation and had been conquered
by the Allied Powers . This fact shaped in a measure the
character of the terms in the peace treaty. It has been
argued by some that Hungary was only technically at war
with the United States and England. She showed a friend
-
1. N.Y. Times, Ju e 5,1°20.17:4
,
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ly attitude toward them during the War by refusing to
intern American and English residents within her juris-
diction, and even permitting them to continue their
1
.
usual occupations. Others have stated that the purpose
was clear- that the justification lies in the fact that
there were many national antagonisms within the Hun-
garian borders for which the Hungarian Government it-
2
.
self was responsible. Still others have pointed out
that Hungary did not go into the war because she wanted
to, and that she did not enter the war for territorial
3.
gain, but that she was driven into it. She feared
Russia, and she feared the Pan-Slav movement. Birinyi,
in his book The Tragedy of Hungary , says with regard to
the Treaty of Trianon and its partition of Hungary,
"There was no reason, but there was a purpose.
That purpose was to create new states in the Balkans,
so that neither Germany nor Russia should gain con-
trol of the Balkans. A keen state of rivalry ex-
isted, and continuous controversy among the Balkan
states ensued. Consequently, Germany cannot com-
plete the erlin -Bagdad Railroad, nor can Russia
obtain an ice-free port in the Balkans. As a re-
sult the commercial and financial magnates of Eng-
land and of France can hold in their power the un-
disputed control of the international commerce of
the world. "4.
Birinyi further declares that Hungary is the key-state
geographically of Europe. The economic and territorial
rehabilitation of Hungary would result in the reopen-
1. Powell, 121.
2. Bass, 191.
3. A full discussion of why Hungary went into the war is
t
iven in Part II of this thesis.
.
Birinyi, The Tragedy of Hungary
.
216.
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,
ing of International commerce in southeastern Europe.
If this would happen, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Jugo-
slavia would become friendly to Hungary; and the peoples
of southeastern Europe would be libing in peace. This
would mean that France and the international financial
groups controlling France would lose control of Czecho-
slovakia, Rumania, and Jugoslavia. It would mean inter-
national commerce with the Far East would be opened up.
It would help the unemployment situation in England.
World chaos would disappear. This the international
financiers do not want. They do not want to see economic
and territorial rehabilitation of Hungary. They want
the continuation of world chaos. That is the real un-
der lyiner reason for their opposition to the economic
1
.
and territorial rehabilitation of Hungary.
Powell says that the cards were stacked against
Hungary at Geneva, a fact which, well-known to the diplo-
matists, afforded great glee to the governments of the
Little Entente, caused the opponents of the League to
shrug their shoulders in cynical amusement, and brought
discouragement and gloom to its sincere supporters.
There is a grain of truth in the statements and
thoughts of each of the attitudes cited above. Hungary
1. Note: I am not commenting on the logic of Birinyi's
argument, but presenting it merely as an attitude on
the justice of the terms. 298-300.
2. Powell, 155.
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Is geographically a key-state. If she is in a condition
of upheaval and chaos, the nations around her will feel
the results of her condition. Perhaps the cards were
stacked against Hungary at Geneva. That is the treatment
that any conquered nation might expect. On the other
hand it ought not he condemned for trying to get the
best arrangements and greatest concessions possible in
the final settlement.
c. Content of the Treaty-
(>1) Catalog or brief outline-
The treaty includes three hundred and sixty -four
articles, protocol and declaration. The plan is the
same general one used for all the peace treaties be-
tween the Allied Powers and the conquered nations.
Part I- the Covenant of the League of Nations, Articles
1-26, and annex.
Part II- the frontiers of Hungary with Austria, with the
3erb-Croat-Slovene State, with Rumania, with Czecho-
slovakia; and the boundary commission.
Part III- political clauses for Europe, including Italy,
Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Rumania, Czecho-slovakia,
Flume; protection of Minorities; clauses relating
to nationality; political clauses relating to certain
European States Belgium, Luxembourg, Schleswig,
Turkey and Bulgaria, Austria, Russia and Russian
States, and general provisions.
Part IV- Hungarian interests outside Europe, including
Morocco, Egypt, Siam, China.
Part V- Military, naval and air clauses, including the
effectives and cadres of the Hungarian army, re-
cruiting and military service, schools, educat ' on-
al establishments, military clubs and societies;
armaments, munitions and material; auxiliary crui-
sers to be disarmed and treated as merchant ships;
inter-allied commissions of control, general articles.
.*
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Part VI- Prisoners of War and Graves.
Part VII- Penalties.
Part VIII- Reparation, general provisions, reparation
cominis si on
.
Part IX- the Financial Clauses- points not settled or not
in violation to the settlements and recommendations
made by the Reparation Commission in Part VIII.
Part X- Economic clauses- commercial relations, ship-
ping, unfair competition, treatment of nationals of
allied and associated powers, treaties, debts, pro-
perty rights and interetss, contracts, prescrip-
tions, judgments, rhixed Arbitral Tribunal, Indus-
trial Property, Special Provisions relating to
Transferred Territory.
Part XI- Aerial navigation.
Part XII- Port, waterways, and railways; navigation-
more particularly of the Danube; hydrauliv system;
telegraphs and telephones, disputes and revision
of permament clauses settled as provided for by
the League of Nations.
Part XIII- Labor. The same as the Treaty o r Versailles.
Part XIX- Miscellaneous provisions and protocol.
(2) Outstanding articles-
The articles which will be discussed directly in this
thesis are:
Article 27, which limits and defines the boundary of Hun-
gary;
Article 29, which defines the power of the Boundary Com-
missions ;
Article 53, the disposition of Flume;
Articles 54-60, on the question of Minorities;
Articles dealing with military, naval, and air provi-
sions, most particularly Article 104, which limits
the size of the army;
Articles 161-174 inclusive, and annex II-VII, on the
subject of reparation.
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Article 27-
The definite boundaries of Hungary were promul-
1
.
gated on June 13, 1919. It was found necessary to come
2
.
to some decision because of the activity of Bela Kun.
Hungary's frontiers were designated as follows:- start-
ing from the junction of the Czechoslovakian and Austri-
an frontiers near Bratislava, southeast to the mouth of
the Ipel river, then along its course to a point ten
kilometers below Lucenec, hence southeast above Salgo-
tarjou, northeast up to a point lying twenty kilometers
south of Kosice, southeast above Satoral jau jhely to
Csap, thence along the Tisza to the junction of the Ru-
manian and Czechoslovakian frontiers. After running
west of the Satul Mare line, it turns west, and runs
south to Mako to the Jugoslav frontier below Szeged;
hence south to the junction of the Haros and Tisza
southwest to a point on the Drava south of Pecs; hence
1. The situation became so acute between Bela Kun and
the Rumanian and Czechs that the Peace Conference in-
tervened and forced Bela Kun to retire to the Czech
front. Fighting continued with the Rumanians who oc-
cupied Budapest August 8, 1919. F.P.A. IV-14, 278.
2. Bela Kun was an Instructor in the University of
Kolosvar before the war; became an officer in the
Austro-Hungarian army, and was captured by the Russian
army in 1915. It was this contact with Russian theories
th&t so well-equipped him for his task of leading Hun-
gary in its second serious revolution.
».
1
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west and northwest along the Drava to the mouth of the
Mur; along the Mur, then north to Szentgotthard ; hence
north to K8szeg, then makes a loop to include Sopron,
crosses Lake Neusiedler (Fertfl), thence north to the
1
.
Czechoslovak frontier.
Statistics showing what the treaty limitations
$
have actually done to Hungary vary to some extent, but
the following information is conceded by both those who
are sympathetic with Hungary's status since the close
of the war, and by those who claim to have only a sci-
entific and critical attitude toward Hungary in her
contribution toward another chanter in the world's his-
2
.
tory.
1. Lncy. Brit. 13th ed. New Vols. 11-390.
Statesman's Year Book of 1920,971, the following summary
is taken:- The new state's boundaries begin with: Ger-
many at Pressburg, running parallel with the Danube as
far as Grau; then north and northeast to Hogosbzet, on
the Theiss; then southwest to Magylak on the Maros;
then west as far as Beremendo on the Drave; then north
to Pressburg.
2. The following table has been prepared from statis-
tics given in various sources. In practically every
case here, as in places elsewhere in this report, where
a large discrepancy is apparent, there is a different
understanding of the word used, or a different classi©
fication. Variations are surprisingly small. Fig-
ures are given in round numbers for the most part; and
are to be taken as general indications only, as too
much importance should not be attached to figures.
•.
•
.
,
.
.
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1
.
Losses
Raw Material Percent
Area 68 2,
Population 59
Arable land 57
Forests 85 3.
Meadows ---75
Pastures— 70
Cattle — 65
Pigs 49
Horses 53
Sheep -72
Production of Salt 100
Iron Ore 81 4,6.
Gold (Fine) 100
Silver (Fine) 100
Copper Ores 100
Zinc Ores 100
Pyrites 100
Manganese Ores 100
Coal Production Black) 27) 5,6.
Brown) 30)
1. Popular Literary Society, p. 51, unless otherwise
noted.
2. November, 1922, the Boundaries Commission revised in
favor of Hungary 35,000 acres more from the lost pro-
vinces, several villages on the Jugoslav border around
Szegeden; and the big estates of the former Archduke
Friedrich on the Austrian border. N. Y. Times, Nov. 13,
1922. 14:7.
3. 78$ timber trade supplies, crushing the cellulose
and paper industries.
4. 100% of Northern Hungary's iron ore.
5. The figures on coal seem to have the greatest varia-
tion of any, due probably to a difference in the use of
the term. The Nation uses the term "coal-producing
lands," and has the small figure of 16%; the Living, Age.
Popular Literary Society. Statistics , and others use
the term "coal fields "- 60%
.
Hungary's bauxite deposits are among the largest in the
world. 3.Y.B. 1929,995.
6
.
The Nation, April 5 , 1919,530, comments that Hun-
garian brains developed these, and the Czechs get the
benefit
.
<1
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Industries Per c ent
Iron and Metal 50
Machine 18
Stone and earthenware— 41 1.
Wood and bone 78
Leather 42
Spinning and textiles --59
clothing 25
Paper 78
Foodstuffs- (Manufactured) 43
Chemicals--- 45 2.
Printing--- 12
Wool 58 3.
Factories 46 4.
Hallways Percent
5.
Roads and highways of the
Government and Munici-
palities 60
Educationa 1 Institutions
Elementary Schools 62
Superior elementary schools 56
Grammar and real schools ( gram-
mar schools without classi-
cal languages.) 53
There is no question that the geographical unitvy
of Hungary, upon which historians have commented so
much, has been ruined. The fertile plain has been
left to her intact, however. 'Wheat, the chief product
1. The Nation- 23%.
2. The Nation-26%.
3. 86% of the trade lost went to the Czechs.
4. Living Age, p.154.
5. Absolute losses- S .Y.B. ’ 29, 997
.
1<
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of the Alf8ld, assures the Hungarian population a
sufficient quantity of that foodstuff. To be sure,
)
sixty-five percent of the wheat land and fifty-nine
percent of the arable land has been lost, but the loss
of population offsets the need for wheat and arable
land to some extent . Hungary has about twenty-eight
percent of her former territory with thirty-six percent
of the former population to feed and keep employed. It
is quite evident, then, that the figures in themselves
are misleading. When comparing post-war Hungary with
old Hungary the losses are appalling, but examining
them with reference to reconstructed Hungary, the com-
parative figures show that the picture is not so black.
Hungary has not been distorted so much as she has been
shrunk. This fact is little consolation to the Hun-
garians who find themselves made less powerful to the
advantage of their neighbors. Hungary finds that
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Jugoslavia control the
raw products which formerly belonged to herself, and
which she feels she needs to keep her factories busy.
Take, for example, the item-forests. Hungary lost
eighty-five percent of her forests to Czechoslovakia,
Jugoslavia and Rumania. According to industrial fig-
} ures, she has lost seventy-eight percent of her pa-
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1
.
per industry. In order to keep her factories busy and
her people employed, Hungary argues that she must import
raw products. The establishment of trade relations with
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Jugoslavia means that in
order to build up her own country she must assist her
enemy neighbors by buying from them what she believes is
rightfully hers, and what she had for years been develop-
ing. It is, of course, embarrassing for Hungary to find
herself so dependent upon the three nations which have
for their purpose keeping Hungary small and powerless.
Nevertheless, Hungary lost not only many of her sources
of raw products, but she lost forty-six percent of her
factories as well. Thus, she does not need the same
amount of raw material as formerly. She lost sixty-
four percent of her population. Her loss in population
is greater than most of her losses in products to be
manufactured. Thus, the forty-six percent loss of fac-
tories and the losses of products to be manufactured are
tending to offset one another. These losses to Hungary
are apparently not fatal. Although they tend to make
Hungary agricultural rather than industrial, Hungary has
2
.
shown general economic progress in recent years.
1. See previous tables.
2. -2 ,C .Donaldson-Rawlins
,
Department of Overseas Trade,
March, 1925. 3ee also section in this thesis dealing with
the financial Reconstruction of Hungary.
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Number of people of each race in the groups
included in the new States, in thousands.
Mag, Ger
.
Jews Slov. Rum
.
Ruth
,
Jug. Others
Hung
.
C.in 7td /S7 <T~o - sn 7^
Aus
,
2<r -2S S' M - - si —
jCz-Sl /AO 276 // 7-20 /o 730 r s~t
J.-s.
S'to ‘T'tt
7-0 {0 76 /> / s~z>
Rum,
/, rrz S~SLO /3F- / 0 <S,SSlo c2. 0 /OJL
Fiume> S' S2 A. - -
-
/s'
Total f^vr" t, <P<7 730 0 770 2,7s-b 4~^> 0 3, <rZO
2/
New States Square miles Percent of po- Total po-
acquired from pulation from pulation
Old Hungary Old Hungary acquired
.
Hungary
/// 3( 7/ -5“V 0, o-o-O
Austria
/, 3 do, <*"—**-#
Czechoslo-
vakia o?3, 7ry
. Li 3 , Tic b ,
Jugoslavia
^7
,
x 7 7 <£. o~7>
Rumania
* d, 6~ JZ/ <S>
Fiume 2/ „ S~Oj
Total / *2 . </, / £-*3 / —z)
1, Temper ley, Haro Id . Foreign Affairs , April, 1928,447,
and Temperley, History of the Peace C onference , V, 151
.
2. Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, V,151.
c
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The Germans and the Jews formed the largest Mi-
norities. Of the twenty million eight hundred ninety
)
thousand people in pre-war Hungary, only nine million
three hundred and forty- five were Magyars. The other
eleven million five hundred and forty-five thousand
comprised six considerable racial minorities who were
under the domination of the Magyars. Not only were
these minorities placed under other governments by the
new boundary delimitation, but the large groups of
Magyars were cut off from Hungary and given to Czecho-
slovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania. What actually hap-
pened was that Hungary has been given a more nearly
pure Magyar population, and the problem of minorities
which formerly belonged to Hungary has been trans-
ferred to Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Jugoslavia.
1
.
There were formerly in Hungary one-half as many
Czechs as Hungarians, fifty-five percent as many
Jugoslavs as Hungarians, and sixty-nine percent as
many Rumanians as Hungarians. The Magyars, actually
2
.
in the minority, always ruled. Under the treaty stipu-
lations, the boundaries between these countries were
drawn so as to have the racial groups correspond with
1. Concluded from Temperley’s tables quoted on previous
page.
2. Haskins and Lord-Some Problems of the Peace Confer-
ence, 232 .-"The earliest census of nationalities that we
have and the only one that was taken by relatively im-
partial officials, the census of 1851 "
•-
. .
.
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the countries in which these groups were living. The
Czechs were given fifteen percent of the total number
f of Hungarians left within the Hungarian borders. The
Jugoslavs had a Magyar minority of nine percent; and
the Rumanians, who received the largest group of Mag-
yars, were given twenty-four percent. While the divi-
sion may not be ideal, and while the minority grouos
may not be as small as possible, they are somewhat
smaller than under the former arrangement. The greatest
adjustment came between the Hungarians and Rumanians.
The seemingly large paper loss for the Hungarians under
the treaty settlement is a source of discontent. Ne-
vertheless, it is apparently not so unjust as the divi-
A
sion under which the Rumanians lived as a minority group
1
.
in Hungary until this change took place.
>
1. Pertinent material on possibility of revision will
be found in the discussion of Article 29 of this thesis
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Article 29 -
This article gave the Boundary Commissions certain
clear and well-defined tasks. '‘They (Boundary Commis-
sions) shall have the power not only of fixing those
portions which are defined as /a line to be fixed on the
ground, ' but also, where a request to that effect is made
by one of the States concerned, and the Commission is sa-
tisfied that it is desirable to do so, of revising por-
tions defined by administrative boundaries; this shall
not, however, supply in the case of international fron-
tiers existing in August, 1914, where the task of the
Commission will confine itself to the re-establishment
of sign-posts and boundary marks. They shall endeavor in
both cases to follow as nearly as possible the descrip-
tion given in the Treaties, taking into account as far as
possible administrative boundaries and local economic in-
terests
.
"The decision of the Commissions will be taken by a
majority, and shall be binding on the parties concerned."
It is observed from this article that the Commis-
sions have a great deal of power if they wish to exercise
it. The Delimitation Commissions were given power to
reoort what they considered boundary injustices of the
Treaty of the League Council, which Council might at-
tempt rectification. In certain cases, the Commissions
c 3uld use their own judgment as to the justice done and
the advisability of revising. These powers have ap-
parently not been used extensively by the Commissions.
.°
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After the Peace Conference, two commissions on fron-
1
.
tiers were appointed- Czechoslovakia and Rumania. On
June 15, 1922, the Inter-Allied Delimitation Commission
signed at Suhotica a protocol definitely fixing the
2
.
Hungarian- Jugoslav boundary. The decision was in favor
of Hungary. Thirty-five thousand acres from the lest
provinces, several villages on the Jugoslavian border a-
round ^zegeden, and the big estates of the former Archduke
Friedrich on the Austrian border were returned to Hun-
3.
gary
.
The Hungarian delegation had asked repeatedly for
plebiscites to be held under the direct supervision of
the Allies. At first the Commissions refused all re-
quests for granting plebiscites. The attitude of the
Allied Governments was that if the plebiscites were con-
ducted fairly, there would be no substantial change
since the action had been taken only after minute study
of ethnograohic conditions and national aspirations
4.
reported by alleged experts. Further, the Allies con-
tended, plebiscites were not necessary. ,J-’he wish of the
peoples was expressed in October and November 1918 when
the Dual Monarchy disappeared under the blows inflicted
by the Powers, and when long-oppressed populations wel-
1. Current History, 1920, 615. Also Temper lev-How the Hun -
garian Frontiers V7ere Drawn
.
Foreign Affairs, April, 1928,442.
2. Survey of Foreign Affairs, Toynbee, 1924, 437.
3. N.Y.Times, Nov. 13, 1922.14:7/
4. Temperley. History of the Peace Confer ence , IV. 422-423
.

54
corned their Rumanian and Jugoslav and Czechoslovakian
1
.
brethren. The Powers did admit, however, that at cer-
tain points the frontier traced by them could not cor-
respond precisely to the ethnic and economic needs, and J~n
that an inquiry about these specific points, might justi-
fy a change in a particular place. They refused to do
anything until the Peace was signed. The Commissions
would be appointed fifteen days after the Peace should
become effective. Jhe Commissions could refer their
'findings not corresponding to ethnic and economic ne-
cessities' to the League of Nations. Thus, the frontier
populations were completely safeguarded, and by the
minorities' treaties, the Hungarian minorities in
2
.
Hungary's border countries were to be protected. In
the case of Sopron a plebiscite was finally granted, and
3 .
Sopron voted to remain with Hungary. The territory of
German West Hungary was to be turned over to Austria
without a vote, and a Commission was appointed by the
Principal Allied Powers to supervise the transfer. The
Commission consisted of General Ferrario, the chairman,
representing Italy, General Hamelin, representing France,
and General Gorton representing England. The Commis-
sion met at Sopron, August 1921, and fixed August 29 as
1. Temperley. P.C . IV, 423.
2. Ibid, IV, 423.
3. Ibid, VI, 556.
..
.
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the date for Hungary to withdraw. When the day came,
however, and the Austrian gendarmeries entered the
area, they were met by a body of Hungarian irregulars
who unceremoniously ejected them and assumed control
of the territory. The Commission of Generals had no
force at its disposal, and found itself powerless to
combat this turn of affairs. The Hungarian Government
defined the movement as a national one beyond its power
to check or control. The Generals accepted for the
moment the action of the irregulars and recognized them
as the police authority for the area only as a temporary
measure. They then referred the matter to the Conference
of Ambassadors. During the month of September the Am-
bassadors were attempting to bring pressure upon the Hun-
garian Government, but without effect. At this time
Italy and Czechoslovakia both offered their services as
mediators of the situation, and the Italians made a
definite offer, with the result that a conference of the
three Foreign Ministers was held at Venice, October 13.
At the Venetian Conference it was agreed that "while the
Hungarian Government should take the most rigorous steps
to compel the Hungarian irregular forces to evacuate the
remainder of the territory, a plebiscite should be held in
1
.
the town and in eight adjoining villages." The Com-
1. Survey of Foreign Affairs , 1924, 305
<i
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mission of Generals was to remain at Sopron to supervise
the holding of the plebiscite which should take place
eight days after the Generals were satisfied that the
pacification of the territory was complete. The town
was to vote one day and the eight villages were to vote
the next. The Commission was also to make arrangements
for the voting "so that the plebiscite may take place
in as simple and expeditious a manner as possible." The
Boundaries Commission was to send allied troops to So-
pron. This Venice Protocol was approved by the Conference
of Ambassadors on October 27, 1921. On November 23, the
Conference agreed to send allied troops to police the
plebiscite area. The first detachment arrived December 8,
and the Hungarian forces left four days later. The ple-
biscite was held December 14 and 15. The Allied Officers
were present, and polling stations were guarded by Allied
troops. The result of the vote was fifteen thousand
three hundred and thirty-four in favor of Hungary, and
eight thousand two hundred and twenty-seven in favor of
1
.
Austria. Seven wards of the town and two villages voted
for Hungary, one ward and six villages for Austria. The
Austrians protested that the voting registers were not up
to date because the Hungarians had previously maintained
1. Temper ley, VI,556-f.n.2
..
,
.
.
-
,
'
.
-
57 .
control of the area. Nevertheless, the plebiscite was
recognized because eighty-five to ninety percent had
voted. If the other fifteen percent had voted in favor
of Austria it would have made no difference to the final
result. On February 25, 1922, Austria finally agreed.
In other points, as at Sopron, the Magyars had a
strong case for revision. To be sure, the Commissions had
been advised by experts on the ethnic, military and geo-
graphic sides of readjustment of boundaries; and had the
Allies agreed to any amount of revision the entire work
of the Boundaries Commission would have been upset. Ne-
vertlft.es s, there ’were many places where rounding off
A
along the border would do no harm, although the adminis-
trative boundaries do not dit the ethnic ones. The
"Batchka from below Bajo to near Szeged in is now in
1
.
Jugoslavia." One hundred and twenty-six parishes in
Bacs-Bodrog are tabulated as forty-four German, forty-
one Slav, and thirty-four Magyar . "No one proposes a
German independent state, although the -Slavs are more
1
.
numerous than the Magyars." Why should the Magyars
receive it? Yet on the Rumanian frontier, the restora-
tion of the Arad-Szatmar strip could easily be urged to
be given back to Hungary . To meet the Rumanian need in
the north an indented railway might be constructed among
1. Temper ley, Foreign Affairs , IV, 442 ff.
.•
'
.
,
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the foothills of the east, though it is an expensive
project. The Hungarian Government might offer to do
it, pay for it, on condition that when it is completed,
the Rumanians will return to her the Arad-Szatmar
strip. Such an offer would be easy for Hungary to
1
.
make and difficult for Rumania to refuse."
Thus, it seems that some of the demands of Hun-
gary are justified. Diplomacy is notoriously tor-
tuous and subtle, and a stranger to frankness. Hence,
the attitude that the Allies neither wish to make ad-
justments nor to hold plebiscites, is not surprising,
though it may be reprehensible. Perhaps the Allies
wilfully misinterpreted the fact that the plebiscites
could not be conducted fairly. Perhaps the Allies
noted with disgust that Hungary could not control her
irregular troops in German West Hungary until the Allies
guaranteed to accede to her wish on granting a plebis-
cite. It took only five weeks for Hungary to evacuate
the Bopron area so that the plebiscite could be held.
There is no evidence that the plebiscite was not conducted
fairly or that the Hungarians exerted undue influence in
the plebiscite area. The Allies may have felt that
Hungary's requests were not important compared with the
many other problems of reconstruction which must be
1. Temper ley, Foreign Affairs, 445
(
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settled. Certainly it was a perfectly fair challenge
to the ideals upon which peace was being constructed
with regard to the principles of self-determination
of peoples and the rights of minorities. Hungary was
challenging the Allies. The Allies seemed to be annoyed.
One's reaction is that the Allies were manipulating facts
to their own advantage, regardless of the fact that their
former decisions might be improved uoon . If to have had
more plebiscites would have led to more satisfaction
among the Magyars, and if to have had no substantial
change in the result (which point of view was contended
by the Allies, but disproved by the result of the r opron
plebiscite), what harip in granting the requests of
Hungary? After all, the purpose of the Peace Conference
and the readjustment agreements was to bring about more
nearly normal conditions in hUrope. The categorical
refusal of the Ames to cooperate with Hungary leads
one to feel that the Allies still continued to regard
Hungary as a conqu^ered nation which had no rights to
consideration. Hungary had apparently faith in the
ability of the Allies to conduct the plebiscite fairly,
and showed them she was willing to cooperate. The re-
buff which she received was far from convincing anyone
that Hungary would or had received a fair deal, and
was hardly conducive of cooperation on future occa-
sions between Hungary and the Allied Powers.

Article 55 -
6e
.
"Hungary renounces all right and title over Fiume
and the adjoining territories which belonged to the
former kingdom of Hungary and which lie within the
boundaries which may subsequently be fixed.
"Hungary undertakes to accept the dispositions made
in regard to these territories, particularly in so far
as concerns the nationalities of the inhabitants, in the
treaties concluded for the purpose of completing the
present settlement."
By the provisions of the treaty, Hungary lost Fiume,
her only outlet to the sea. Henceforth her foreign trade
would be at the mercy of her immediate neighbors. Hun-
gary particularly desired Fiume because for years she
had used tjairs as her commercial port. Its geographical
position was desirable. Hungary gained access to this
port by a decree of Maria ‘‘•‘heresa in 1776. Maria Theresa
wanted to give the port to Hungary, but the inhabitants
protested so strongly she was forced to achieve this end
by the expedient of making it a "corpus separatum, "
1
.
"annexed to the Crown of Hungary." Hungary developed
it as her commercial port. Few Hungarians had settled
1. Warren, Fiume and d'Annunzio .A
',
.
.
,
.
,
,
.
.
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in Fiume, however. The population consisted mainly of
Croatians and Italians. To counteract the influence of
the Croatians in-47Lume Hungary favored the Italians,
but in 1867 the Hungarians began to import Magyars into
Fiume to such an extent that even the Italians became
alarmed. The latter accused the Hungarians of attempting
1 .
to make Flume Hungarian in population. The Italians
maintaffed their dominant position in that region, and at
the close of the World 'War the disposal of Fiume became
an international problem. Italy went into the War
under certain conditions stated in the secret treaty
of London, 1915, which included the promise that Italy would
.
receive Trieste, the Trentino, Cisalpine Tyrol with its
geographical and natural frontier (the -Hrenner fron-
tier), the counties of Gorizia and Gradisca, all Istria
as far as the Quarnerp and including Volosca and the Is-
trian islands of Plavnik, Unie, Canidole, Palazzuoli,
San Pietro di Nembi, Asinello, Gruica, and the neigh
-
2
.
boring islets. The following Adriatic territory
"shall be assigned by the four Allied Powers to Croatia,
Serbia, and Montenegro: In the Upper Adriatic, the whole
coast from the bay of Volosca on the borders of Istria as
far as the northern frontier of Dalmatia, including the
coast which is at present Hungarian, and all the coast
1. Haskins and Lord, 256 .
2. Treaty of London, 19 15 .Article 4. Temper ley,
V
, 385
. .
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of Croatia, with the port of Fiume and the small ports
1
.
of Novi and Carlopago." In the treaty of London, Italy
laid no claim to ±'iume . It is alleged that she purposely
omitted the port from her demands because Fiume was then
controlled by Austria- Hungary, and that all the Powers,
including herself, believed that Austria- Hungary would
continue after the War as a Great Power, and that it
(Austria-Hungary) must have at least one port on the
2
.
Adriatic .
There were several courses of action open to the
Allies in disposing of Fiume. They might give Fiume
to Italy, which would alienate the Jugoslavs; they might
give Fiume to Jugoslavia, which would alienate the Ital-
ians; or, they might make it a free state. The Allies
decided on the latter plan. Gabriele d'Annunzio, an
Italian, occupied the position of Regent and Birector
of foreign Affairs in Fiume, and drew up the Constitu-
tion, dated August 27, 1920. By this Constitution,
"Fiume, for centuries a free Italian commune, by the
unanimous vote of her citizens and through the
lav/ful voice of the National Council, openly dedicated
herself wholly and entirely to her mother country, on
3.
Oc t ober 30,1918."
1. Treaty of London, 1915. Article 4. Temper ley V,385.
2. Ibid, Article 5. Note, 386-7.
3. The Constitution as translated by Whitney Warren, 3.
*.
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Upon the fall of d'Annunzio it was realized that
the Fiume question was not closed. By the election of
April 24, 1921, the Nationalists, who had set their hearts
on annexing Fiume to Italy were defeated by the Autono-
mists. The Nationalists would not give in. There was
"another National Putsch; the electoral urns were burnt;
the Prov'sional Government resigned; and the Italian
authorities intervened by appointing one of the Nation-
alists leaders, M. Bellasich, as Commissioner Extraor-
1
.
dinary." The Autonomist leader, Zanella, fled to
Buccari in Jugoslav territory. No amount of diplomacy
succeeded in bringing the two factions together, so the
Italian Government then "cut the knot by appointing an
Italian officer as Royal Commissioner who arrived in
Fiume June 13, and tofwhom Bellasich resigned his
2
.
powers." Various negotiations relating to Fiume
were said to be attempted; but when on June 25 Count
Sforza admitted in the Italian Parliament that certain
territorial assignments had been made to Jugoslavia, a
party of Legionaries seized them- Port Baros and the
Delta- by force, and Sforza' s government was forced to
3.
resign. The Legionaries evacuated in September. On
October 5 , the Constituent Assembly, with many Autono-
1. Survey of For. A p f
.
,
1924 .411
.
2. Ibid, 412.
3. Ibid, 412.
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mists seated, convened by order of the Italian High
Commissioner. Zanella, the Autonomist leader, became
President of the Assembly only to be overthrown by the
Fascisti in March, 1922. In October of the same year the
Italians and Jugoslavs came to an agreement. Susak
,
the
town overhanging the left or southeast bank of the
Recina river, was indisputably Jugoslav, and to be evacu-
ated within five days of the ratification of the agree-
ment. As soon as orders for evacuation had been given, a
Mixed Commission of three Italians and three Jugoslav
members, assisted by experts, was to proceed to super-
vise evacuation of Susak, to delimit the frontier between
Jugoslavia and the Free State of Fiume, to open traffic with
Fiume, to organize the service of the port on the techni-
cal and administrative side, and to organize the function-
ing of the ‘-'tate of Fiume on the basis of Article Four of
the Rapallo Treaty.
Three days after Italy signed the convention with
Jugoslavia (October 26,1922) the Fascisti marched upon
Rome, the Ministry resigned, Victor Emanuel invited Mus-
solini to form the Government. Although many felt that
with this "apparently irresoonsible and violently Na-
1
.
tionalist Government in the saddle," Fiume was again a
1. Survey of For. Af f ., 1924.416
.
.,
-
. .
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danger point, Mussolini handled the Fiume question
quietly. The final settlement stated that the Free state
should be extinguished and partitioned between Italy and
Jugoslavia; that while r Italy had the lionfs share of ter-
ritory, ample economic facilities should be given to
Jugoslavia in that section of the port which was to
come under Italian sovereignty. Count Sforza's conces-
sions of Port Daros and the Delta were to stand. The
parts which would still be in direct territorial contact
with Italy, though the coastal strip v/ould be narrower than
1
.
before, were to pass in full sovereignty to Italy. Thus,
in 1924, Fiume was formally annexed to Italy.
The Jugoslavs had wanted the port of Fiume. The
Croatians, now known as J ugoslavs, were nearly as impor-
tant a racial group in Fiume as were the Italians. The
port was well-developed ^nd ready for the use of the
Jugoslavs who received the support of Czechoslovakia and
Rumania in their demands. Indeed, the chief aim of the
newly-formed Little Entente was to completely emancipate
the smaller nations of central Europe from the Austro- un-
gar ian yoke, so that they might either be reunited with
the peoples to whom they were racially related' or be
2
.
recognized as independent national entities. -Since
1. Survey of For. Aff.,1924, 4l6.
2. League of Nations, VI
,
No .2 . Post -'Jar Alignment s
,
1925. 115
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Hungary appeared to be the most serious offender against
the rights of small nations, the efforts of the Little
Entente were directed mainly against Hungary. France sup-
ported the Little Entente, and Hungary found herself
isolated and alone, facing slim possibilities of a happy
and prosperous future. From the Peace Conference until
after Hungary joined the League of Nations in 1922, the
Little Entente emphasized the isolation of Hungary and
the enforcement of the Treaty of Trianon as a definite
policy. Hungary was working for a revision of the
Treaty. A "resurrection" of Hungary from her dismember-
ment would mean that Czechoslovakia would lose her eas-
tern extension; that Rumania would lose Transylvania; and
that the Serb-Cr oat -Slovene State would lose a good deal
1
.
after the first hyphen. And so, these nations banded
together in the Little Entente. When Hungary joined the
League it was only the members of the Little Entente who
raised the question respecting the advisability of fa-
vorable action upon the Hungarian application. In the
committee they raised that point, and received a formal
declaration from. Hungary of her sincere intention to
fulfill “all her intentional obligations in accordance
with treaties and acts subsequent to their signature,"
a declaration specifically including engagements respect-
1. F.P.A.IV-442.
**
.
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Ing the Hap gt,urg dynasty. The Little Entente finally
voted for the admission of Hungary into the League. It
later decided not to vote against the Hungarian recon-
struction by the League. The period was characterized
in Hungary by the Hed and White Terrors, determination
of Hungary to revise the Treaty, and the attempted coup
d’etats by Charles of Hapsburg. It was only after the
Sinaia Conference and the fourth League Assembly in 1923
when some of the difficulties were settled and Hungarian
reconstruction was begun that the Little Entente becmae
more conciliatory. From 1924 to 1927 the antagonism
between Hungary and the Little Entente was less apparent.
The change in attitude was due partly to the fact that
Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia had been turning
their attention to making alliances with the Great Powers,
and although they had kept an eye on Hungary, their in-
terests were divided to such an extent that their watch-
fulness had been less intensive.
In 1927 Hungary ended her period of isolation. On
April 5, she signed a treaty of friendship, conciliation,
and arbitration with Italy. The Little Entente was
disturbed, and returned from its preoccupation with the
World Powers to pursue a more aggressive policy toward
Hungary. In spite of this attitude of the Little
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Entente, the Alliance gave Hungary confidence in herself,
and a feeling that other Powers and States of the
1
.
world might soon reinstate her as Italy had done. Ac-
cording to the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship,
"there shall be constant peace and perpetual friendship
between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Hungary.
The High Contracting Parties undertake to submit to a
procedure of conciliation, or, if necessary, to arbitra-
tion, all disputes of any nature whatsoever which may
arise between them, and which it may not have been pos-
sible to settle within a reasonable time by the method
of diplomacy." Provisions for the method of arbitration
are laid down in the Protocol.
The Treaty was signed at Rome, April 5, by Musso-
lininand Bethlen, ratified on August 8, and registered
with the League^ November 1.
At a convention agreed to at the same time, the port
2
.
of Riume was to be Hungary's outlet. Mussolini and
Bethlen both approved of Fiume as Hungary’s commercial
port, although it had taken a few days longer to pre-
pare this convention than the Treaty of Friendship.
Other ports had been offered for Hungary's commercial
use. Jugoslavia suggested Gpalato. Saloniki on the Ae-
1. F.P.A. IV-14, 281
.
2. N. Y. Times, April 4, 1927. 7:2.
..
.
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gean, had been offered by Greece; and even Constanza
oh the Black Sea, had been considered a possibility by
1
.
the Rumanians. France frowned on this treaty and agree-
ment between Italy and Hungary, because she felt it was
directed against Jugoslavia. Relations between Italy
and Jugoslavia had bee'"' strained ever since the Treaty
2
.
of Tirana in 1925. Hungary said that the Treaty of
•Friendship and the Convention of Fiume were not made with
prejudice toward anyone, although both Hungary and
Italy were pleased that Fiume was agreed upon rather
3.
than any of the other ports. In order that Hungary might
use Fiume it was necessary for her to make an arr^gement
of transit across & small stretch of Jugoslavia. Count
Bethlen claimed that before he arrived in Italy he had
had the assurance of Jugoslavia that such an arrangement
might be made.
Hungary was particularly happy over the Convention
because it was the first convention or alliance since
the War where she had been treated as an equal power and
not a conquered one.
By the Convention, Jugoslavia was vitally affected
because Italy began a policy whereby she is surrounding
Jugoslavia with States with close treaty relations or
friendly attitudes toward herself. Jugoslavia is now
1. Current History, June, 1927,400.
2. N. Y. Times, April 6, 1927. 6:1.
3. Ibid, April 4,1927.7:2, April 6,1927.6:1.
.•
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isolated and surrounded by actual and potential enemies
such as Hungary and Greece; although it should be men-
tioned that leading politicians at Budapest profess to
see in the recent agreement with Italy a prelude to an
Hungarian- Jugoslav agreement which 4m turn will help
to ease the Itaio-Jugoslav tension. France did not
object to the Convention between Italy and Hungary, but
she did object to having her prestige lessened by Italy.
It is apparent from recent alliances that Italy is be-
coming friendly with all the '’enemy" countries of the
war period, whereas France is attempting alliances with
the small States friendly with the Entente. In this
policy, Italy continues supporting Hungary in Fiume, and
Mussolini has declared that Hungary can count on the
friendship of Italy. The Italo-Hungarian alliance seems to
indicate the beginning of a firm alignment of European S
States. It was ratified in the Hungarian Parliament by a
vote of one hundred and twentyQ-six to thirteen after op-
position remarks had been made by the Socialist deputy,
1
.
M. Varna i . Admiral Horthy gave the "consent of the
2
.
throne" to the agreement.
As soon as Hungary made the alliance with Italy she
began to gain prestige. Several victories were gained
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for Hungary, and they apparently cannot be explained
except on the ground that Mussolini had a greatddeal
of influence, and used this influence for Hungary’s
1
.
benefit. And so, the power of the Little Entente
seems to be broken, and Hungary's days of isolation
are seemingly over. Hungary is again beginning to
play an important part in the politics of central
Europe.
1. a. Property Dispute with Rumania a victory at Geneva.
b. Transylvania land-case. Decision reversed in favor
of Hungary
.
c. "Arms" episode. In January, 1928, a shipment of five
carloads of machine guns was made at St. Gotthard
on their way from Italy. Budapest claimed they were
meant for Poland. Poland, along with Czechoslovakia,
disclaimed any knov ledge of the shipment. The
Balkan Powers differed on the action that should
be taken. The Budapest Government declared an or-
der to destroy the arms, and although Italy finally
agreed to an investigation of the incident, she
backed up Hungary in her point of view, and the
case was finally dropped. This is a manifestation
of the "friendship" between Italy and Hungary as a
result of the Treaty of Friendship. See Current
History, pril, 1928.143-144. Also, League of
Nations: Official Journal, April, 1928, 395-396.
..
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This group of articles deals with the Minorities
question within Hungary. The provisions in brief are
that Hungary agrees to protect the life and liberty of
all inhabitants of Hungary without distinction of birth,
nationality, race, language or religion. All persons
born in Hungary, who were not born nationals of another
State shall ipso facto become Hungarian nationals. All
Hungarian nationals shall be equal before the law re-
gardless of race, language, or religion. '’Difference of
religion, creed, or confession shall not prejudice any
Hungarian national in enjoyment of civil and politi-
1
.
cal rights." Hungary shall provide for adequate instruc-
tion of all Hungarian nationals within her territory in
the language of the nationals "in the towns and districts
in which a considerable oroportion of Hungarian nationals
2
.
of other than Magyar speech are resident." This pro-
vision does not mean that the Hungarians cannot make the
Magyar language compulsory in those schools, but they
cannot exclude the minority language. These provisions
are under the direct supervision of the League of Na-
tions, and any member of the Council of the League will
1 . Treaty of Trianon, Article 58 , Para. 2.
2. Ibid,' Article 59.
..
-
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have a right to bring before the League any infringement
of the Minorities guarantees.
The idea of protecting minorities was not a new one.
It had its beginning in the gradual dissolution of the
Turkish Empire in the nineteenth century at the time
when Greece, Serbia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Montenegro
1
.
had been established. The first instance provided for
protection of the Catholic religion in Greece. The pro-
tocol accepted in February, 1830, by Great Britain,
France, Russia, and Greece provided that "'The Plenipo-
tentiaries of the three Allied Courts being desirous
moreover of giving to Greece a new proof of the benevo-
lent anxiety of their Sovereigns respecting it, and of
preserving that country from the calamities which the
rivalry of the religions therein professed might excite,
agreed that all the subjects of the new State, whatever
may be their religion, shall be admissable to all pub-
lic employments, functions and honors, and be treated
on the footing of perfect equality, without regard to
difference of creed, in all their relations, religious,
2
.
civil, or political.'" This principle was extended in
1881 when Thessaly was ceded to Greece by Turkey. The
Treaty to which Great Britain, Austria, Germany, France,
1, Temper ley, Peace Conf,V,113.
2. Ibid, V, 113 .
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Italy, and Russia were parties, included a series of
articles which protected the civil and political rights
1
.
of the inhabitants. By 1881 it was observed as a
general principle that all Europe was interested in the
establishment of new States in eastern Europe, which re-
quired the formal declaration of the Great Powers, and
should be granted only under certain conditions. These
conditions included the right of imposing on these States
certain principles of government which had come to hold
the position of fundamental principles to which all
2 '.
civilized States conformed.
At the Peace Conference after the ?orld War the
same conditions prevailed- distribution of territory of
eastern and southeastern Burope. Austria-Hungary had
disintegrated. The Dual Monarchy had had many subjected
racial groups under the rule of its dominant peoples.
These minority groups were to be disposed of. Poland
and Czechoslovakia were struggling for existence, and
many other countries , such as Rumania and the Serb-Croat-
Slovene State were gaining territory and people. Since
the Allied Powers were responsible for the voctory of
the War, it was their problem to dispose of the land and
population wisely, as well as to protect the population
1. Temper ley, V, 114
.
2. Ibid, V, 116.
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which by readjustment would become alien in each country.
Otherwise, discontent might result as the price of in-
justice with friction and war as a climax.
The Great Powers tried as far as possible to have
the population of the district under consideration con-
sulted with regard to its future allegiance. There were
certain places which were so involved- "the Germans and
Poles in Posen and West Prussia, Poles and Ruthenians
in Galicia, Magyars and Rumanians in Transylvania, Serbs
1 .
and Rumanians in the Banat- that nothing could dis-
entangle them. In these cases, rather than impose obli-
gations that the people were willing of their own free
will to concede, it was necessary to assure them that as
a group, as a race, they would have fair treatment. In
the older periods of protection for minorities the prob-
lem was different. The group decided to which country
it would belong. Under the new system, they might choose
a nation which was just being established. At any rate,
the smaller nations of Europe were either forced to
sign special treaties as in the case of Jugoslavia, or
have special parts of their treaty devoted to minorities
as did the Hungarians. The Great Powers felt that whether
the people lived within the borders of their own State
1. Temper ley, V, 121.
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of some other, they should he protected. The old Hun-
garian policy was to give the power of ruling to the "agyar
element in the population, and the non-Magyars held the
status of subject-peoples. The Magyars realized that if
the .people of their own race controlled the Government,
although their population was not the most numerous, they
would have the influence and power in the country and
that they would have nothing to fear from these other na-
tionalities within their borders. Now the League in-
tended to guarantee fairness and a possiblity for the
development to all peoples in Hungary, and in fact, in
all the countries of Europe. The general provisions
were that the minority populations should have rights
equal to those of nationals of the country in protec-
tion of life and liberty and the free exercise of reli-
gion, in the press, in publications, in meetings, and
in the judicial systems; in the districts where the
minority constitutes a considerable proportion of the
population, instruction in the primary schools of the
State shall be given in the language t>f that minority,
and that minority shall be assured of a equitable
amount of the state and municipal budget for educational,
1
.
religious, or charitable purposes.
1. Powell, Embattled Borders . 144-145
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How the minority protection will affect the possi-
bility of Hungary returning to her former position of
power is quite obvious. These other nationalities within
her border, receiving the protection of the League, will
have a voice in the affairs of the Government. Decentrali-
zation of authority from the Magyars will result, and
Magyar domination will no longer be complete. The Powers
wanted to give the newly-created nations of Europe a
guarantee of viability.
Hungary has been very much dissatisfied over the mi-
norities question, because she has felt that the protec-
tion which she is forced to give other nationals within
her own border, and is guaranteed to her nationals with-
in the borders of other States, is being conducted par-
tially. She is forced to observe the minorities prin-
ciples, yet her own people elsewhere are receiving no
consideration. Rumania seems to have been the most seri-
ous offender. In Rumania Hungarians are by far the
1
.
largest minority group, having twenty-five percent of the
former Hungarian population. Temper ley suggested that
an adjustment could be mad<£ here that would relieve the
£•
situation somewhat. Yet, in spite of this, Hungary feels
that her nationals have not received fair treatment. The
fact that for years she treated the Rumanian minority in
1. page 49 of this report.
2. Temper ley, V, 145.
..
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Hungary without consideration does not enter her mind.
Alexander Powell, who claims to have been an eye-witness
in Rumania to the cruel way in which Rumanians execute
minority rights, states that the Rumanian Government was
forced to sign the minorities
1
treaties under pressure
of the Great Powers, and that Rumania had even from
1
.
the outset no intention of keeping them. He quotes
the following as an instance of an outrage- "the minis-
ter of education;., wishes to exclude all kinds of ra-
cial and religious strife from the schools. This can
only be realized if the pupils use Rumanian instead of
their mother-tongue. In consequence he orders that they
shall use that language even in their private intercourse.”
"The director of the railways, General Jonescu, issued
an order forbidding railway employees to announce the
names of the stations or give any information to travel-
(I
ers in Hungarian. The order is quoted as saying, " No
excuse will be accepted for giving any information to
3.
anybody in another language than Rumanian."
The Rumanians ignored the Hungarian minority rights
in Transylvania by seizing the Hungarian property and
4
.
terrorizing the people.
To be sure, these conditions, if they have been re-
1, Powell, 145.
2. Ibid, 148.
3. Ibid, 148.
4, New York Times, Jan. 15, 1924.12:1.
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ported accurately, are no worse than those under which the
Rumanians and other minorities lived in Hungary previous
to the Treaty of Trianon. Nevertheless, two wrongs do
not make a right. If the Allied Powers have guaranteed
the rights of minorities, and if they force Hungary to
observe these principles, Hungary has a right to expect
the same treatment for her nationals who are minorities
in other countries. Hungary has felt that since the
League has done little to alleviate this condition among
her nationals elsewhere, the administration of the mi-
norities clauses is partial and unfair. In the case of
the Hungarian optants in Rumania, the Commission of the
New States declared that the property of the Hungarian
optants should remain, without prejudice of any kind,
under the regime of the national lav/, and that the in-
sertion of an additional clause to this effect was un-
1
.
necessary. The case was decided by the League of Nations
since the problem
,
in spite of certain legal aspects,
2
.
v/as decidedly political.
1. Agrarian Reform in Roumania and the esse of the Hun-
garian optants in Transylvania before the League of
Rations
., 1927 . 317.
2. Ibid, XIII.
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Article 104. and other military, naval and air clauses-
The total number of military forces in Hungary was
not to exceed thirty-five thousand men including officers.
This provision created a great disturbance in Hungary be-
cause the Hungarians believed the number was too small to
adequately take care of their territory, even though it
had been reduced to about one-third its former size. They
were being menaced by the Red Terror or Bolshevism, said
to have been introduced largely through the soldiers who
had come in contact with Bolshevism among the Russian
army after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk . In fact, not
long after the Treaty of Trianon had been signed, Hungary
had an excellent illustration to offer the Peace Confer-
ence in proving her point. While Communism was grasping
the country, the umanians attempted to force it out.
The Communistic regime held sway from March to August,
1
.
1919, under the leadership of Bela Kun . Although
Alexander G-arbai, a stone-mason, became President of the
Hungarian Republic, Kun took control of the Foreign Of-
fice and was the Government’s real Director. He was in
close touch with Lenin, whom he had known through his
1. p. 43, footnote 2 of this report.
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his contact with Russia as a prisoner of war. In fact,
Lenin had sent him back to Hungary after he had imbued
Kun with the doctrines of Communism. Communists were put
in all the important positions. Courts were abolished,
and in their place were set up "revolutionary tribunals"
composed of Communists. Many murders, which have not
been explained otherwise, have been attributed to the
scheming and practices of the leaders of this regime.
Communism succeeded in disorganizing industrial life, and
adding to the suffering of Hungary, with this regime came
a terrible hate of the Jew, due in part to the fact that
Bela Kun and many of his associates were -Tews
.
^—due—irr
pagfe—fco the- fact that “Bela Kun and many of • hi s assoc lates
were <T ewa-. Soon after Kun began his activity, Admiral
Horthy, who was a man of excellent ability and had had
good training in the Austrian navy, took over the train-
ing of the counter-revolutionary troops. There have
been gross exaggerations as to the number of Red and
Ti7hite murders or so-called executions. The Red Terror
started the violence, and everything that came afterwards
was attributed to it. It was a regime of disorder and
1
.
destruction, and the '.Thite Terror was a counter movement.
On March 21, Kun seized the Government. The next day
1. Bass, 207.
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the Revolutionary Governing Council proclaimed its doc-
trines. It stated that the proletariat had taken mat-
ters into their own hands because the bourgeois world
and capitalistic production had collapsed. Foreign
politics were facing a crisis, too. The Paris Conference
had decide! to occupy nearly all Hungary by arms. The
Revolutionary Governing Council demanded iron discipline.
"Bandits of counter-revolution and brigands of plunder
will be punished with death. The Council organizes a
powerful proletarian army to assert the dictatorship of
workers and peasants against Hungarian capitalists and
landlords as well as Rumanian boiars and Czech bour-
1
.
geois." Kun apparently lost his head, and struck at
that part of the Rumanian army that was occupying a part
of Hungary. General Smuts arrived in Budapest early in
April to negotiate with Kun's government on behalf of
the Allies. He offered to recognize the disputed lines,
not as a political frontier, but as a line of demarcation
only, to be bordered by a neutral zone. Kun insisted that
2
.
Bolshevism must be introduced into the neutral zone.
Smuts therefore broke off negotiations. By the middle
of April, the Russian army advanced along the line of de-
marcation up the Tisza (Theiss) River. On May 5, the
Opposition Government, set up at Arad, issued a Mani-
1. Graham, 558-559.
2. Encyclopedia Britannica, XIII , New .Vols .3,393.
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festo in which it accused the Communist Party and its
leaders of unchaining anarchy and planning the complete
collapse of the country. "The Communists have made a
complete destruction of the country their aim. Nowhere
is there a serious attempt to restore public order, or
1 .
to revive economic activity and productive work." The
purpose of the counter-revolution and the Counter-Revo-
lutionary Government was to maintain order; the govern-
ment was provisional and temporary. Annihilation of
Bolshevism, restoration of order, and the liberty of the
person, of property and the right to work, were among
their program. A well-trained armed gendarmerie were
necessary to carry out their plan. They also wanted to
establish friendly relations with the Jntente States,
and to eliminate the differences of opinions between
themselves and their neighboring States. They wanted
to undo the work which the Revolutionary Government had
accomplished, such as-annul the laws and decrees which
1
.
the Revolutionary Government had passed.
Kun, hard pressed, in May secretly offered the Ru-
manians an armistice, while he prepared the Red Army for
use in Czechoslovakia in June. "When he had conquered
Slovakia and severely endangered the Czechs, he accepted
1. Graham, Documents , 563-5 .manifesto of the Counter-Revolu-
tionary Government at Arad,
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the decision of the Peace Conference as to the Rumanian
1
.
and Czech frontiers.” On June 8, Clemenceau wrote Kun
a note in protest of the Red Army's action. Since the
Allied Powers had guaranteed that if the Hungarian army
was not sufficient to look out for the country, the Al-
lies would intervene, they felt it necessary in this in-
stance to do something. Kun "had used the army as a ful-
crum with which to move Paris, and had rallied Magyar
nationalism to his suoport ; when he fell back from Slo-
vakia in obedience to Paris, his cause was discredited
both at home and abroad. From that time, in mid-June,
the army lost its morale, and counter-revolution crept
forth from its hiding places. The fatal mistake of a
proletarian republic v/hich had turned its face eastward
to Moscow was to come to terms with Paris. No government
could endure that tried to serve two masters; Paris
quickly discovered this and set about to crush to So-
1
.
viet." The Soviets, having lost what they had gained,
now turned to terrorism to combat the counter-revolution.
They apparently became red-handed murderers, and under
the direction of Tibor Szamuelly, it is alleged that
2
.
wholesale hangings and killings took place. On June
13, the boundaries of Hungary were limited because of
the internal conditions of the country. On June 20,
1. Graham, 236.
2. Ibid, 237-238.
,.
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Eela Kun began hostilities against the Rumanians who de-
feated him and advaced toward Eudapest . In panic, Kun
fled to Vienna. Julius Peidl, a Socialist Democratic
minister under Karolyi, formed a purely Social. Democratic
Cabinet, which guaranteed the protection of private
property. He made no obvious changes from the former
regime. During a Cabinet meeting he and his Cabinet were
arrested by the Budapest Chief of Police on the ground
that they had no right to represent the country. Peidl
resigned, and the Archduke Joseph reasserted a right
which he claimed to name Friedrich as Premier and himself
1
.
as Administrator od the State. The return of the Arch-
duke Joseph filled the neighboring States with alarm.
The Rumanians still continued their attacks on Hungary,
and on August 8, occupied Budapest, pillaging everything
within their grasp. The activity of the Rumanian army
had at first been welcomed by many Hungarians who were
afraid of the Red Terror, but as the months progressed
the presence of the Rumanian army was a source of bit-
terness among the Hungarians in general. The interfer-
ence of the Allies did not impress the Hungarians as
being effective, and they felt more helpless than ever.
The country in geperal had never accepted Bolshevism.
1. Graham, 24
1

It was the result of the work of a few leaders. The
Rumanian army had expected to wipe out the evil, and
had they stopped when Bela Kun’s regime collapsed, their
services would have seemed to the Hungarian people more
real and sincere. It must he noted, however, that the
Rumanians were having their moment of opportunity to
return the former visit of the Hungarian army to Buchar-
est . The Rumanian army occupied Budapest from August to
1
.
the middle of November when Horthy took over the gov-
ernment of Hungary with Friedrich. The Supreme Council
of the League of Nations had repeatedly asked the Ru-
manians to withdraw from Hungary, but since the
requests were never backed up with force, and since a
firm policy had not been used in the case of Bela Kun,
the Rumanians felt that the reouests of the Supreme
Council need not be taken too seriously. The fact that
though they might have been justified in giving the Hun-
garians a yiiiB of the treatment the Hungarians had
given the Rumanians a few years previously did not help
the situation in forming peaceful relations, nor in sof-
tening the already deep feelings of hate between the
two peoples. The Hungarian people were convinced that
1. Horthy- Powell says that Horthy was not a great states-
man; yet a man of ability, sincerity, and strength of
character. He was born in 1868 at Szolnok in eastern Hun-
gary into a fami’y of the lesser nobility. During the War
he was an Admiral. His greatest service to his country
was restoring order after the fall of the Communist re-
gime. Embattled Bor ders - 163-164.
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their army of thirty-five thousand was not sufficient for
them to clean up the situation existing within their
borders, and were more dissatisfied than ever on the
points dealing with the delimitation of the defense ma-
terial. If the Allies had made a definite plan to clean
up the situation in Hungary, and then had overseen the
execution of the plan, they would have rendered a valuable
service to the peace of lurope. After order had been re-
stored, an army of thirty-five thousand would probably
have been adequate to maintain order. However, the Al-
lies did nothing constructive, and as a result the Hun-
garians have an excellent illustration of what their
small army can do for them, and of what support she can
expect from the Allies.
I
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Articles 161-174 -
This group of articles deals with the question of
reparations. "The Allied and Associated Governments
recognize that the resources of Hungary are not ade-
quate, after taking into account the permanent diminu-
i
tions of such resources which will result from other
provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete rera-
1
.
ration for such loss and damages" In spite of these
limitations she must make certain payments because she
was an enemy and conquered nation. The Treaty provided f
that a Reparation Commission would be appointed by cer-
tain Powers named in Annex II. The articles go on to say
that the Hungarian Government shall be given an oppor-
tunity to be heard whenever any claims are made upon her
by the Reparation Commission. Hungary shall pay, within
the course of the year 1920 and the first four months of
1921, "in such instalments and in such manner (whether
in gold, commodities, ships, securities or otherwise)
as the Reparation Commission may lay down, a reason-
able sum which shall be deter ined by the Commission.
Out of this sum the expenses of the armies of occupation
subsequent to the armistice of Hovember 3, 1918, pro-
1. Article 162

89 .
vided for by Article 181, shall first be met, and such
supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by
the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers essential to enable Hungary to meet her obliga-
tions for reparations may also, with the approval of the
said Governments, be paid for out of the above sum. The
balance shall be reckoned towards the liquidation of
1
.
the amount due for reparation." Hungary shall direst
application of her economic resources to reparation as
specified in Annexes III, IV, V.
The Commission is not to be guided by any rules or
code of laws, but rather by Justice, equity, and good
faith. When Hungary does not pay in gold or in ships,
securities, commodities, or otherwise, Hungary shall be
required to furnish guarantees. The Commission is es-
pecially instructed to take account of: " (l) the actual
economic and financial position of Hungarian territory
as delimited by the present Treaty, and (2) the diminu-
tion of its resources and its capacity for payment re-
sulting from the clauses of the present Treaty. As long
as the position of Hungary is not modified the Commission
shall take account of these considerations in fixing the
final amount of the obligations to be imposed on Eun-
1. Article 165
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gary, the payments by which these are to be discharged,
and any postponement of the payment of interest which may
1
.
be asked for by Hungary."
In case of default of any payment required, or the
acceptance in fact of these terms, the Commission will
give notice to all interested Powers, and make such re-
commendations as to the action to be taken in consequence
of such default as it may think necessary.
Such is the summary of the Reparation Articles. In
Hungary’s ability to pay, it must be remembered that by
the delimitation of her boundaries, she became essen-
tially an agricultural country. Her factories to the ex-
2
.
tent of sixty-four percent, and many of her raw products
were assigned to her neighbors. The question of Hungary's
ability to pay was, then, doubly difficult. It in-
volved the financial and economic reconstruction of Hun-
gary.
The financial reconstruction of Hungary was es-
sential if Hungary was to become economically sound a-
gain. The two most serious problems were those of a
rapidly depreciating currency and an unbalanced budget.
In 1922, Hungary made a noteworthy attempt to balance her
budget and restore the drown to its true value without
1. Annex II, 12, (b), Para. 2.
2. page 46, of this thesis.
..
,
. .
.
.
.
. .
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external aid. The effort failed for three reasons. "The
country had been weakened and disorganized not only by
the war but by the subsequent revolution. It was bur-
dened not only by specific debts but by the weight of an
indefinite and unassessed reparation obligation. And,
lastly, the attempt was too ambitious. It aimed at not
merely stabilizing but at appreciating the crown. The
failure made anv renewed effort on ^ore practicable
1
.
lines more difficult."
On April 22, 1923, after it was apparent that Hungary
needed external aid in meeting her financial problem,
the Hungarian Government made a formal request to the Re-
paration Commission to lift the charges of her assets
imposed under Article 130 of the Treaty of Trianon so as
to leave them free as security for an ext rnal loan.
"The Commission by a majority decided, while not opposing
the request in principle, to give the release only in
respect of definite loan schemes which must previously
be submitted to it and must include the allocation of a
2
.
definite part of any loans raised to reparation."
The Hungarian Government found in the meantime,
that it would be impracticable to obtain a loan from any
of the financial markets of the world under the above
1. Reports of Commissioner General, Introduction, A. Salter,
page 10.
2, Ibid, page 11.
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conditions
.
At the same time the Sinaia Conference was held in
which Rumania, the Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes,
and Czechoslovakia improved the political situation to
such an extent that the conditions under which a loan
would be granted might be modified for Hungary. Im-
mediately, during the September meeting of the Assembly
of the League of Nations, Hungary settled a great many
disputes with her neighbors. By the end of the month
such progress toward settlement or the possibility of
settlement had taken place, that the Council presented
the following suggestion. "in the event of the Repara-
tion Commission communicating in the near future with the
League of Nations and inviting it to co-operate in a
scheme for a loan for the financial reconstruction of
Hungary, the Council decided to authorise the Secretariat
and the Financial Commission to further any preparatory
work which the Reparation Commission may think should be
undertaken, with a view to permitting the Council to
consider at its next session the conditions under which
1
.
the loan may be carried into effect."
"At meetings of the Council which are concerned with
this question, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, and the
1. Cora .Gen ' Is . Report, p . 11 .Doc . Ill
.
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Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will be invited
to sit as Members of the Council; decisions will be ta-
1
.
ken bp a unanimous vote of the Council thus constituted,”
On October 17, the Reparation Commission declared its
readiness in principle to remove the charge on Hungarian
assets and revenues in order to allow the financial re-
construction of Hungary in collaboration with the League,
but reserved its final decision until it should have seen
the scheme which it invited the League to draw up.
The preparatory work began with a visit of the Com-
mission- M. Avenol, Sir Arthur Salter, and M. Stoppani, on
behalf of the League, and M, Bouniols, of the Financial
Service of the Commission- to Budapest from November 6
to November 17. The Commission made a survey of Hungary’s
economic and financial position, and obtained statisti-
cal information necessary for drawing up a scheme. Mem-
bers of the Government were interviewed, as were repre-
sentatives of all parties and classes, to obtain impres-
sions of public opinion and the wishes of the Hungarian
people
.
From November 20 to November 28, a financial meeting
was held in London. This committee consisted of M.
Jansen, M. Bianchini, M. Niemeyer, M. Parmentier, M.
Pospisil, M. Sekiba, Sir Henry Strakosch, and M, ter
Meulen. The Committee had besides the information and
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recommendations from the above-mentioned members of the
Secretariat, assistance from a delegation sent by the
Hungarian Government. This group included Dr. DeKallay,
Minister of Finance; Baron Koranyi, the Hungarian 'inister
in Paris, Dr. Walko, Minister of Commerce; .Popovics and
M. Telesky, two ex-Minister s of Finance; and Dr. Schandl,
the Under-Secretary of State for Agriculture.
At this meeting the scheme of reeonstruction was
drawn up and agreed to in detail by all members of the
Finance Commission.
The report of the Commission submitted to the Council
December 20, 1923, is in brief as follows: the proble is
partly financial and partlv economic. The expenses of
Hungary have exceeded the receipts. The deficit has been
met by inflationary methods. The crown has fallen in
value. The fall has doubly increased the deficit by re-
ducing the real value of the taxation receipts, and has
at the same time deprived Hungary of a basis on which
her economic life could develop. The trade balance of
Hungary is adverse, partly due to the falling exchange.
The Hungarians cannot be in a sound situation until both
the budget and financial situation and trade balance are
satisfactory. Hungary must not only meet her public ex-
penditure by taxation, but she must produce and dispose
of as much as she consumes.
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Since the problem was so complicated, the League
l
limited and defined the Commission’s control.
"The Financial Commission recommends that any fi-
nancial operations for which the League undertakes any
responsibility should be definitely and expressly li-
mited to remedying the budgetary, and therefore the fin-
ancial, position. The scheme below is essential to
enable the fall of the crown to at o ce be arrested
and its value maintained; it contemplates a balanced
budget after a limited period of reform; and it proposes a
loan for the purpose- the sole purpose- of covering the
deficit during this period. It is true that the Hun-
garian trade balance needs improving; but the necessary
economic adaptation must be effected by Hungary her-
self. The country needs liquid capital for the purpose
of developing its natural resources; but capital must come
not by means of a loan to the Government secured on na-
tional revenue- but through natural and private channels
under the attraction of the economic prospects of Hungary.
The scheme intends to offer stability and security in
the financial basis of the country, which will allow
these prospects of economic development to have their
foreign capital. It follows incidentally from this fun-
damental conception that the shorter the period within
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budget equlibrium can be attained, and the smaller the
amount of foreign money which must be devoted to its
limited but primary object, the quicker and better are
the prospects of capital flowing in through private chan-
nels to assist in Hungary's economic restoration and
development
.
"This is not to suggest that the Commission considers
the economic restoration as of secondary importance,
but no primary financial scheme can save the situation
unless it forms the basis on which the country's economic
1
.
life will develop. n
The following scheme was unanimously recommended
by the Committee: the stoppage of inflation with a view to
the stabilisation of the Hungarian crown, this being as-
sisted by an independent Bank of Issue enjoying the
monopoly of note issue; the balance of the budget by
June 30, 1926, so that thereafter current expenses will
be met by taxation without recourse to either inflation
or loans; a reconstruction loan, secured by specific
Hungarian revenues, to cover the deficit till June, 1926,
so that inflation may be stopped without waiting till
the budget is balanced ( which could probably never be
achieved while inflation was still in progress); a
control through a Commissioner-General appointed by, and
1 9 Commissiner-General' s Report
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solely responsible to, the Council of the League, for
the purpose of ensuring the due execution of the whole
program; satisfactory political relations between
Hungary and her neighbors; suitable arrangements
with regard to her external obligations, particularly
relief credits and treaty charges; economic restoration and
development and all the measures required to assist it,
in oarticular commercial agreements with neighboring
1
.
countries
.
The loan should be secured on certain assigned
revenues of the Hungarian State, with the provision that
the additional revenues shall be assigned if necessary,
and the whole reinforced by the scheme of comprehensive
reform and the control described in this report. Two
classes of revenue were made available as security for
the loan. The first class, revenue to be assigned im-
mediately, consisted of Customs receipts, tobacco re-
ceipts, salt monopoly, and the sugar tax. The Financial
Commission believed that these revenues should give fifty
2
.
million crowns per annum. The additional revenues to
be assigned if necessary, except railway receipts, were
assigned revenue which passed into the hands of the
C ommissioner -General . The amortisation period was to be
not more than twenty years. The loan should be issued in
1.League of Nations, General lurvev- "Hungary "58
2. Ibid, 64.
V
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as many countries as possible.
The choice of a Commissioner -General should not
belong to one of the Four Principal Powers taking part
in the loan or to one of the countries adjoining Hun-
gary. The functions of a Commissioner -General should be
brought to an end by a decision of the Council of the
League of Hat ions, when the League is assured of finan-
cial stabilization of Hungary.
The plan also provided for the establishment of a
Bank of Issue which was to be entirely independent of
Government control. The Bank was to have the sole
right of note issue, must be a central bank, and its
functions those of a banker's bank. The Bank was to
guide also the monetary policy of the country and fix
the bank-rate. It was to aim at the stability of the
crown. The main business of the bank was rediscounting
commercial bills, and it was to act as the cashier for
the State.
It was considered quite necessary for the Bank to
be in operation when reconstruction came into force.
Expenses could be economized to some extent, but there
must be anticipated an increase rather than a reduction
in terms of gold value. This necessitates a substantial
increase in the yield of taxation. The Hungarian tax
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revenue was estimated to yield two hundred million gold
crowns or twenty seven crowns per capita, though it
ought to he able to increase this to fifty gold crowns
per capita. In personnel throughout the Government
economies were attempted, though the salaries o n many
who were retained were actually increased. It was
planned that the budget equilibrium should be attained
by June 30, 1926.
The Financial Commission also observed that it was
essential for Hungary' * economic betterment that commer-
cial treaties should be arranged which will allow freer
interchange of commodities between Hungary and her neigh-
bors. The success of this rart of the program depends
upon Hungary, her neighbors, and even the League. The
Hungarians should find markets for the products for which
her natural resources and natural aptitudes best fit her.
All direct impediments should be abolished- prohibition,
taxes on export, and artificial rates of exchange. Treaty
charges during the period of amortisation should be li-
mited, and paid only with the Commissioner- General's con-
sent
.
The only point left unsettled was what limit upon
reparation payments was necessary if the raising of the
loan or execution of the scheme was not to be rendered
.
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impracticable, by too heavy a burden upon Hungarian bud-
get and currency. The scheme was presented to the
Council at Paris, December tenth to the twentieth . The
Council appointed a committee consisting of English,
French, Italian, Czechoslovakian, Rumanian, Hungarian
representatives, and representatives from the Kingdom
of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. This was known as the
Hungarian Committee. The Financial Committee met at
Paris and finally settled the question of reparation
which had previously been unsettled. On January 1 6,
t,he scheme was officially transmitted to the Reparation
Commission as the League’s definite plan. On February
21, the Reparation Commission raised the liens on Hun-
gary's assets under the conditions required by the scheme.
The following month the Protocols were signed at Geneva
by the countries concerned, and the Council accepted the
responsibility for proceeding with the scheme.
Immediately a Delegation of the League visited
Budapest and started the plan. At the same time nego-
tiations were being opened with the countries holding
Relief Bonds (France, Great Britain, Swede, 1 orway, Den-
mark, Switzer land
,
Netherlands, and the United States) to
postpone the prior charge they had made on Hungary's
assets for relief credits in favor of a new loan. Mr.
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Jeremiah, Smith was appointed by the Council as Commis-
sioner-General
.
Under the guidance of Mr. Smith the plan was exceed-
ingly successful. The currency was stabilized, and the
budget balanced even before the allotted time.
Until the National Bank started operations, the
value of the crown steadily fell. The Bank of Issue
raised the value of the crown by stages until July 31,
1924, from ninety-one thousand and fifty crowns to one
dollar to seventy-eight thousand, seven hundred and fifty
,
or an improvement of thirteen and fiftjf-six one hundredths
percent. The aim of the Bank in causing this moderate
and gradual increase in the value of the crown was to
prevent the reduction of purchasing power within the
country in order to arrest the further rise of prices.
At this time the Bank stabilized the value of the
crown on a sterling basis at the rate of three hundred
and forty-six thousand crowns to erne pound sterling. When
the English pound arose in value, automatically the
crown arose. It actually made a difference of nine and
one-half percent.
With the stabilization of the crown, a new currency
could easily be established . The pengo replaced the
crown. The original purpose of financial reconstruction
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had been to check inflation and stabilize the currency
at a high enough value that the ordinary requirements
for expenditures of the State budget would be covered. A
special budget had been prepared for two and one half
years. According tothis, the revenue collected by the
State administration from taxation would by successive
increases have reached the required amount, while the
excess of expenditure, the deficit, would be covered by
the loan. By 1924-5 the deficit was removed, and in
the years 1925-6, and 1926-7, a surplus of receipts was
shown. The year 1925-6 showed a surplus of twenty-
seven and one-half million gold crowns instead of a
deficit of fifty million gold crowns estimated in the
Reconstruction scheme. In spite of the fact that large
reductions were made that year, eighty milliongold crowns
were realized. The Government was then able to reduce
by half, and later abolish altogether, its housing tax,
cancel the Customs statistical tax, and lower the tax
on sugar
.
The State undertakings (post, postal savings bank,
State railways, State iron works, forests, and domains,
silk-worm breeding, and coal mines) had previously
been worked on a commercial basis, and had been working
at odds. When the Reconstruction Scheme was put into
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operation, the State industries, too, met with success.
By the year 1926-7 those industries had a balanced bud-
get with no deficit.
1
.
as follows:
Revenue from taxation was distributed
2
.
1924-1925 1925-1926 1926-1927
Direct taxes 16.2 21,2 24.9
Turnover taxes 27.5 18.5 18.9
Dues — 10.8 13.7 11.7
Commodity taxes 10.1 11.4 10.3
Salt, net 2.1 2.4 2.2
Tobacco, gross 1P .6 16.6 21
.
4
Total- 100 100 100
Thus, stabilization of currency and the balance of
the Hungarian i-^dget was actually accomplished. Although
the scheme has been apparently more successful than was
estimated, it can easily be explained by the increase in
value of the crown and in the increase of revenue. The
latter in the case of direct taxes is due to better
methods in collecting taxes of this class.
Several ways were employed to curtail expenses of
the government. One of the most effective was reducing
the number of officials on the pay-roll. In the year
1923-4, one hundred and ninety-eight thousand, eight hundred
and seventy-four officials were listed on the budget. The
year 1926-7 budget allowed one hundred and sixty thousand,
five hundred and forty-eight. The reconstruction program,
called for a reduction of fifteen thousand, but actually
over thrity-eight thousand had been removed, llany of the
1, General Survey, 121.
2, 1924-1925 and 1925-1926 showed actual receipts,
1926-1927, estimated.
.-
.
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higher offices were abolished, such as the Price Control
1
.
Commissions and the National Coal Commissioner.
The receipts began to exceed or equal expenditures
as early as October, 1924, six months after the scheme
had been inaugurated; and within one year there was a
surplus of sixty three million gold crowns instead of a
deficit for which ckne hundred million gold crowns were
2
.
assigned
.
Foreign trade showed an increase of eleven percent
on the first nine months of the year 1924-925, and the
adverse visible balance fell from ninety-eight million
gold crowns to fifty-one million gold crowns during the
same period. Unemployment decreased from thirty thousand
in October, 1924, to twenty-two thousand, eight hundred
and sevety-nine in October, 1925. Money becmae substan-
tially cheaper. Whereas the discount rate at the Bank of
Issue was twenlve and one -half percent in December, 1924,
and nine percent in October, 1925, by December, 1925, it
was as low as seven percent. The general interest rates
3 .
showed corresponding reduction. The budget for the year
1926-1927 was approved by the Council on the recommenda-
tion of the Financial Committee. In April, 1926, the Hun-
garian Prime Minister informed the Council that he would
bring up the question of the termination of the work of
1. General Survey, 122-123.
2. Ibid, 146.
3. Ibid, 150 .
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the Commissioner-General in accordance with the nrovi-
sion in Article 6 of Protocol II- "Subject to the provi-
sions of Article VII, the functions of the Commissioner-
Geberal shall be brought to an end by a decision of the
Council of the League of Nations when the Council shall
have ascertained that the financial stability of Hungary
is assured.." Article VII provides that if at any time
after the termination of the function of the Commissioner-
General, and before the loan is entirely discharged,
Hungary finds her budget is to be unbalanced, the League
may a^ain assume control under the conditions previously
agreed to, with the work in charge of the Commissioner-
General, until the League Council again decides that
Hungary is in a financially sound position.
In anticipation of action on the request to terminate
control, the Committee surveyed the situation. The re-
sults were such that the Committee was of the opinion that
the budget was in equilibrium on a sound basis, and that
the monetary stability of Hungary was established, and
that the frank forgeries did not affect the financial
1
.
position of the country. The main points on which they
came to the decision were that the budget was alreadt in
equilibrium or surplus within six months of the adoption
of the scheme, December, 1924; from July 1, 1924, to
1. General Survey, 156
(
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June 30, 1925, a surplus of ninety and two tenths million
gold crowns was accomplished. The first eleven months of
the following year showed a surplus of nearly sixty mil-
lion gold crowns. The 1926-1927 budget was already
approved by the Council on recommendation of the Committee.
The currency was placed on a gold basis, originally sta-
bilized in relation to sterling from the beginning of
the scheme in 1924 and appreciated with the rise of
sterling to gold in April, 1925, and has ever since been
stable in relation to gold. The Bank is in satisfactory
condition. By law a cover in gold and foreign exchange of
twenty percent is required, and the actual amount was
fifty-five percent in 1925. The administrative reforms
called for a cut in employment of fifteen thousand. Up
to 1925 twenty-five thousand had already been removed.
In spite of the fact the Hungarians had removed more
than the bldget called for, the Council urged a further
cut- although they were satisfied with the co-operation
1
.
to that date.
In accordance with the recommendations in the Com-
missioner -General’ s reports the Council resolved on
June 10, 1026. that "the financial stability of Hungary
being assured, the functions of the Commissioner -General
shall be brought to an end on June 30th, 1926, in pur-
1. General Survey, 156-157.
(
107 .
1
.
suance of paragraph 10 of Article 6 of Protocol II."
The twenty-fifth and final report of the Commissioner
General states that Hungary is financially stable. The
C ommissioner -General says that there seems to be no sub-
stantial reason to doubt that this condition will con-
tinue. Should the budget become unbalanced, a serious
situation would result, however. A foreign loan could
not be negotiated without the consent of the Reparation
Commission, inflation would be out of the question since
the National Bank has the sole power of note issue, and
so increase of taxes would probably be the only course
open. This method would be unpopular enough to act as a
deterrent for unwise expenditure.
The Commissioner-General comments on the system used
to stabilize Hungary's finances by stating that "the exe-
cution of the plan has proved even more successul than
anticipated. As was expected, there was a large deficit
for the financial year ending June 3oth, 1924, which was
met from the proceeds of the Reconstruction Loan. Since
July 1, 1924, the budget has been in a state of equili-
brium, and it has been unnecessary to expend any of the
proceeds of the Reconstruction Loan for budgetary defi-
cits. This surprising result is not due to the reduction
in expenditure- for none was contemplated by the plan- but
1. General Survey, 162.
.-
.
*
.
.
.
.
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to unexpected increases in the estimated revenue of the
State over the conservative estimates of the plan due to
the : stabilisation of the currency and the increased con-
fidence which followed it. The currency has been stable
since the National Bank has ample reserves for the main-
tenance of the currency.... the League has now done all
it undertook to do- i.e., to create a sound budgetary
and financial position, which is necessary to establish a
firm foundation for the ^uture upon which the complete
economic recovery of Hungary can take place. Economic
conditions ha.ve slowly and steadily improved since the
plan became effective, and if the present position is
maintained by Hungary itself, the economic conditions
should continue to improve until they reach at least the
1 .
normal pre-war conditions." Officially the League with-
drew on June 30, 1926.
The important service which the Reparation Commission
rendered Hungary in assisting to stabilize the financial
problem has done a great deal toward softening the people’s
attitudes over their alleged injustices of the Treaty.
Because the Commission co-operated, stabilization was able
to be realized, and that in turn brought on better economic
conditions. Here, then, is one illustration of successful
co-operation between the League and Hungary.
1. General Survey, 169. The League defined its task ori-
ginally as being limited to remedying the budgetary and
financial position, although it pointed out that the
oroblem which confronted Hungary was a double one:
^financial and budgetary on the one hand and economic
on the other .
"
t
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IV- Reception of the Treaty-
a. General Reception-
In January, 1920, when the first draft of the Treaty
was submitted, public opinion became hostile because the
terms reflected the fact that Hungary was actually, and
was to be treated as, a conquered nation- an enemy coun-
try. The Hungarians had felt that they were only techni-
cally at war. Count Tisza had not been enthusiastic for
war. It was the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy that
had manipulated so that the struggle came. Hungary be-
1
.
ing a part of the Dual Monarchy, was forced in. Then,
too, the Hungarians had treated the Allied citizens with-
in her borders fairly during the war, and had attempted to
2
.
make an armistice agreement with the Allied forces. The
first draft seemed entirely unsatisfactory to them. On
January 17, the first reports of demonstration were heard-
Budapest flew black flags on all its public buildings and
stores in protest of the terms, and the Pester Lloyd, Hun-
garian Daily Newspaper, is quoted as saying that the terms
3.
of the Treaty were annihilating. Count Apponyi is quoted
as saying that the acceptance of the terms of the Treaty
1. page 23 ff. of this thesis.
2. page 35, ff . of this thesis,
3. N.Y.Times, January 19, 1920.
.»
-
.
.
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would mean the "cultural downfall" of Hungary. "Con-
cerning the internal physical conditions of Hungary,
"
Count Apponyi said, " we have been pillaged of everything.
In the first place, we have had the hardships of war;
secondly, we have had two communist administrations when
all our money was spent abroad for propaganda; and third-
ly, the Rumanians robbed us of manufacturing machinery,
even printing plants and railroad equipment, so that now
we have but twenty seven locomotives. Our agricultural
interests which the Central Lur opean Powers ruined by
taking away our livestock, is in a condition of general
devastation beyond the River Theiss.... I tried to make
the Premier Lloyd George see that it was in the general
interest of humanity to assist us and that cutting us up
was an economic crime. As proposed in the treaty we should
have no wood, lumber, coal, salt, iron or ore. It is
mockery to ask us to live after these are taken away...
The nationality principle is constructed in defiance of
geopgraphy and economics and also destroys the tradi-
tions of the people whom it cuts off from home. From
generation to generation there will be revolts. It is a
transfer of national leadership to races inferior in
culture. It is the destruction of our schools and uni-
versities, leading people back to ignorance. It is the
I
Ill
cultural downfall that mankind cannot witness without
1
.
abhorrence .
"
A communication from Basle, Switzerland
,
dated Janu-
ary 26, says that a dispatch from Budapest states that
Hungary's military representatives at Neuilly had sub-
mitted to the Entente Plenipotentiaries that the mill-
2
.
tary clauses were not acceptable. From London on Janu-
ary 26, came a communication that Count Apponyi was go-
ing in person to Paris as head of the Hungarian Peace
Delegation to hand to the Entente Hungary's solemn refu-
sal to sign. An army of thirty-five thousand was not
sufficient to maintain order in the interior under present
conditions, or to protect the frontiers against Bolshe-
vism, and insure the execution of the obligations which
3.
the Allies demanded.
On January 31 of the same year, Admiral Korthy,
Regent of Hungary, is quoted as saying, "Hungary will
sign whaever terms of peace are submitted to her, be-
cause it : s only in this way that time can be gained for
4.
the re-organization of the Hungarian army."
Soon Revision Clubs began to organize. The effect
of the opposition was felt only in small ways. A new
treaty was submitted. It was in reality a revision of
the first, and there were no material changes. The
1. N.Y.Times, Jan . 22, 1920 .8 : 2 .Vienna, Jan. 20.A. P.
2. Bauler, New Danger to the Peace of Europe .
3. N.Y. Times, May 17, 1920. 17:3.
4. Ibid, May 30, 1920. 15:1.
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people were not content. The Secret Organizations be-
gan to show activity. The Territorial Integrity League
sponsored the publication of posters with such signs as,
'‘Damned be the hand that signs this treaty." Crowds in
oublic meetings took oaths never to consent to the muti-
1
.
lation of Hungary. The National Creed of the Magyars
2
.
was as follows:
"i believe in one God, I believe in the Unity
of my Country,
I believe in one Eternal Divine Justice,
I believe in the resurrection of Hungary*.
Amen
.
Secret societies were preparing to act against the
Government. According to the documents of one of these
groups which were brought to light, it was going to pre-
vent by force the meeting of the Assembly and to pro-
claim a new Government. It is believed that if a poli-
tical revolt had succeeded at this time, it would have
meant the eventual restoration of the Hapsburgs
.
The
former Emperor Charles of Austria, wanted Hungary to
accept the treaty with a secret clause permitting his
3.
return
.
’tfhen Hungary finally decided to sign, gloom pervaded
Budapest. Many suicides occurred. Disorder was aoparent,
1. N. Y. Times, May 11, 1920. 8:7. via A.P.
2. Hauler.
3. N. Y. Times, May 17, 1920. *7:3.
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but precautions had been taken to prevent revolts and
disavowals of the signing of the treaty. While the
treaty was actually being signed, the stores in Buda-
pest were closed, public utilities and work ceased,
1
.
church bells were tolled. It was truly a day of
national mourning. Parades in protest took place, though
they were peaceful. Thousands of refugees from the lost
provinces participated. The Treaty was denounced in the
National Assembly, in the churches, and in public meet-
ings, as an outrage against justice and humanity.
Later riots occurred in which "awakening Magyars" killed
several Jews and wounded many more. The Allied Mis-
sions at Budapest protested to the Hungarian Government,
demanding restoration of law and order.
In November the ratification of the Treaty took
place. Count Teleki took the responsibility of signing
the terms, and urged each member of the Cabinet to do
likewise. Some left the Assembly immediately. The re-
maining members of the Assembly arose and sang the Hun-
garian National Anthem as a last shout of defiance be-
fore ratification. Then followed the formal ceremony of
acceptance of the Treaty by the National Assembly.
In the meantime the Revision Clubs had been busy.
1. Current History, August, 1920,877
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From the Prager Tagetlatt Is quoted the Hungarian Recruit’s
1
.
Oath
:
H
I swear in the name of the Holy Virgin Mary that
I will fight against Czechoslovakia and Rumania
for the liberation and reunion of the occupied ter-
ritories with the mother country, and I will fight
for the suppression of every, socialistic movement."
AristtdE Briand, Prime Minister of France, had realized
the significance of what had been done to Hungary, and
declared in the French Chamber that it had been necessary
to cut deep into the living flesh of Hungary. Imri P.ad-
vanyi, who was the General Secretary of the First Hun-
garian Insurance Company, said that the Peace- Dictate of
Trianon was such a horrible injustice that the Magyar
nation was perfectly justified in carrying on a constant
peaceful agitation for its overthrow. Hungary's hope was
in the League of Nations, which could not refuse a just
revision of the Trianon Peace. For, without revision,
there cannot be permanent peace in central Europe. "if
there is justice in Heaven and Earth the name of Trianon
after a revision, will be only a bad dream. The Magyars
can never reconcile themselves to this peace- and appeal
against it to everybody from whom has not yet disappeared
2
.
all sense of Natural Justice."
On September 1, 1920, Dr. Benes made a speech before
the permanent Parliamentary Committee in which he ex-
1. Current History, August, 1920. 877.
2. Radvanyi
,.
•
• *
,
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plained the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia. "The Mag-
yars are faced by very serious social problems.... The
Czechs have agreed with their neighbors to point out to
Hungary that she must change all her traditional ideas,
her social structure, and her political methods, if a
situation is to be created which will enable Hungary to
1
.
live on good terms with her neighbors.--" a striking
example of the spirit that brought the Little Entente
into being, and is holding Hungary down
.
Hungary has no malice toward the Allies because
they defeated her. She accepts that as a fortune of
war. She is disturbed, however, because the Little
Entente has been allowed to have influence which she
was denied. In one case, it was Rumania robbing a de-
fenseless people, for the Rumanians had been ignoring
the minority rights of the Hungarian nationals within
2
.
her territory, and terrorizing the people.
By June, 1925, ther.e had been established about
thirtyOfive societies of importance with over six thousand
members- Double Cross Blood Society, Arpad Blood Society,
Holy Crown Association, and others. These societies
committed political murders, were active in franc
counterfeiting plots, and had for their chief purpose
the reunion of Hungary. Judges, lawyers, politic ials, and
military officers were members. No doubt many crimes
1. The New Europe, Sept. 9, 1920.213.
2. N.Y.Times, Nov. 26, IX, 8, 7. Nicholas Poyzl.; and Jan.
15, 1924,12:1.
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which have been attributed to these societies do not
rightfully belong to their list. Nevertheless, the
orgainzations took matters into their own hands; and,
therefore, must take the blame or criticism for all
these crimes,
b. Propaganda
-
The Hungarian officials are apparently bent on
restoring Hungary, Propaganda walked boldly into the
schools. The Government of Budapest printed and offi-
cially approved a great number of didactic works for the
purpose of implanting in the hearts of the young, the
belief in the territorial integrity of Hungary. A few
1
.
illustrations follow:
"Manual of Rhetoric, by Dr. Eartha Joszef and
Pronay Antal (5th edition, Budapest Szent Istvan
Tarsulat 1922) approved by the Minister of Public
Education, with the number 152956/ 18.
Examples of Style-
a. Description: The authors chose the description
of the statue of the Hungarian king, Matthieu Cor-
vin d'Huniade (p A9 ) -- his two hands rest on
his sword- one would say that he is aware that he
must be ever ready for battle .’
Matthius Square in Kolosvar is the place in Hun-
gary where one can best dream the most wonderful
dream of our greatness of yester-year- (note that
Kolosvar Club is to-da£ in Rumania.)" 2,
1 . Bauler : New Dangers to the Peace of Europe . 21
.
2. Bauler, 24
.
The diagrams within this section are a type of propaganda
put out by the Royal Hungarian Government. 7/hether they
are reliable or not, the various Commissions sent to Hun-
gary for official investigations have used the material
therein digramed as the basis for their recommendations.
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“Manual of Mathematics used in the second and third
secondary classes by Prof. Mere.y Jules; Fourth edi-
tion Budapest, 1922.
Theme: Mutilated Hungary (exercises Nos. 98-
114, p.158 and following).
No. 98. In 1910 the territory of Hungary (with-
out Croatia and Slavonia) was 282,870 sq.km. In
1920, the area of mutilated Hungary was 91,114
sq.km. 7/hat percentage of our territory is tem-
porarily lost?
No. 103. As a result of the Treaty of Trianon,
mutilated Hungary had only 7,481,954 inhabitants
of which 88.4^ were Hungarians, 7 > 5% Germans,
2.2^ Slovakians, 0.6% Roumanians, 0.6% Ruthenians,
0.3^ Serbians, and 9% of other nationalities. 1.
Find the number of inhabitants of each nationality .
“
It may be noticed with interest that the youth of
Hungary is being schooled in this subtle way to not ac-
cept the “mutilation" of Hungary. The feeling of re-
sentment is being kept alive.
c
.
Opinions of individuals which have been expressed-
Birinyi says that the result of the Treaty of Tri-
anon is the mutilation of Hungary, and that it is the
most cruel tragedy that any member of the human family
has experienced. It has ruined territorially, economi-
2 '.
cally, and nationally the Hungarian nation.
Lord Newton, an English Statesman, defined the
Treaty as "the most disastrous and senseless action for
3.
which international statesmen have been responsible."
Hungary has found a staunch supporter in Lord Ro-
1. Bauler, p.24.
2. Birinyi, 220.
3. Requoted by Birinyi from Frank Vanderlip's “What Next
in Europe, p.75.
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thermere, who has connections with the London Daily-
Mail, the Evening News, the .eekly Dispatch, the Daily
Mirror, the Sunday Pictorial and other publications.
Viscount Rothermere blamed the Treaty of Trianon for
creating unnatural economic frontiers in Central
Eurooe, "the injustice of which is a standing menace
1
.
to peace." Rothermere suggested a revision of the
treaty and holding of plebiscites by the United States
or some other disinterested nation to solve the Minori-
ties question. The appeal of "othermere was reprinted in
the Budapest Journal Az Est during July, and was received
in Hungary with enthusiasm. The Little Entente did not
care for Rothermere' s suggestion. Dr. Benes, Foreign
Minister of Czechoslovakia, stated that Lord Rothermere
was both incompletely and incorrectly informed regard-
ing Central European affairs, and offered to give him
the facts of the situation. Count Rothermere, by his
periodical connections, was able to carry on an exten-
sive campaign in favor of Hungary;
Lord Newton said that the severity of Trianon was
greater than that in the Treaty with Germany. Hungary
was not pro-German, but she was forced into the War with
2
.
the rest of Austria. For the crime she committed she
1. London Daily Mail, July 26, 1927.
2. Popular Literary Society, p. 17, Reports of Members
of Parliament
.
See also p. 23 ff.- this thesis.
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had been duly punished in economic ruin, Rumanina occupa-
1
.
tion, and Bolshevism. Another grave offense of Hun-
gary was that she "chooses a monarchy instead of a Re-
public . If they are eccentric enough to prefer a on-
archical form of Government, and eventually to select
some extremely uninteresting personage as the head of the
State, why in the name of common sense should they not
be allowed to do so? In my opinion a Monarchy is no
greater danger to the peace of Europe than a Republic...
There is no evidence in history, so far as I am aware, to
shov/ that a Republic is nece-sarilv a more peaceful
2
.
Government than a Monarchy."
Lord Bryce, too, believes in revision. Both Lords
Newton and Bryce observed that the antagonists of Hun-
gary had had the press entirely to themselves. Both ob-
serve a strong pro- British sentiment in Hungary even
during the "ar . Lord Bryce's opinions were based on ex-
perience acquired through frequent visits to Hungary;
Lord Montagu, recently returned from Hungary, was of the
opinion that the treaty was too harsh, and must be re-
3.
vised
.
The argument of some is that the Allies did not
know what they were doing when they partitioned Hungary.
1. Popular Literary Society, p.18.
2. Ibid, p. 19.
3. Ibid, p. 20.
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The deliberations were held in secret so far as the
people of the world and their respective civil govern-
ments were concerned. Birinyi says the basis of the work
was control by "politics”, based on "public opinion,"
which was manufactured in the various countries by news-
papers, most of which were controlled by financial
1
.
interests
.
Dillon says that the Peace Conference did not have
adequate knowledge of the facts that were, or should have
been, the basis of a just and durable peace. "Giants in
parliamentary sphere, they shrank to the dimensions of
dwarfs in the international."... "in matters of interna
-
2
.
tional politics they were helplessly at sea."
The chief opponents of revision are the small States
of the Balkans which came into being at the sacrifice
of Hungary partially.
It seems that with the countries and the personali-
ties who have expressed themselves in fa^or of revision
there is justice in Hungary's point of view. Whether
revision is the right thing or not, it is certain that
the support which Hungary is receiving from various
countries and individuals is shaping public opinion
within the borders of the country more definitely than
ever. These supporters can certainly do a great deal
f or Hungary if they organize the ir forces
.
1. Birinyi, 191.
2. Dillon: Inside Story of the Peace Conference
.
102-105
.
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V. Conclusion-
Hungary is not satisfied with the Treaty of Trianon.
She accepted it in 1920 because she saw nothing else to
do. She came out of the War a loser. Nevertheless
,
the
terms of the Treaty were such that at that time she was
not viable. In order to make it possible for Hungary to
survive, and reinstate herself to pre-war prestige, she
immediately complied with the orders of the Entente.
Her biggest mistake after the cessation of hostilities
was in complying too readily with the wishes of the
Entente, namely, in evacuating certain territory.
Once Hungary had left, the Allies easily turned the
territory over to the new possessors. Had Hungary
remained within them, she would have been able to trade
with the Allies for more advantageous terms.
Hungary’s chief objections to the Treaty of Trianon
were that she was '‘mutilated"; that an army of thirty-
five thousand was too small to maintain order within her
territory; that the unity and life of Hungary was des-
troyed by leaving for her only one-third of her former
territory and less than one-half of her former popula-
tion; that plebiscites should be granted; that she should
have a commercial port through which to carry on trade.
<I
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She was most bitter over the fact that the losses which
she suffered were going to her enemy-neighbors’.
Hungary very effectively proved her point with re-
gard to the inadequacy of the army. She was overrun
with Communists, and could not seem to place the Govern-
ment on a firm foundation. The Allies attempted to help
her by allowing the Rumanian army to go into Hungary to
drive out the Communists. The Rumanians, instead of doing
as expected, overran the country, and added to the woes
of this already well-torn land.
Hungary resented her state of dependence upon her
neighbors. Besides territory and population she lost
factories, raw products, and prestige. She deeply resen-
ted her enemy-neighbors enhancing their own fortunes
at her expense. Hungarian brains had developed the in-
dustrial system of which Czechoslovakia was to reap the
benefit. Her national pride was hurt. The Peace Treaty,
by limiting the country in size, changed the proportion
of land under cultivation. In pre-war Hungary the area
of ploughed land was almost equal to the area composed
of forests, meadows, and pasture- land . The area of
ploughed land to-day is twice as large as the forest
1
.
and pasture-land. It will therefore take the country
1. Rav/lins : Dept. Overseas Commerce. March, 1925, 40,
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some time to adapt itself completely to these changed
conditions
.
Hungary believed that plebiscites should be held
in the detached areas. The Allied Powers refused Hun-
gary's request on the ground that the wishes of the
people had been consulted before assignments were made.
How were the people consulted? Allied"experts"made
recommendations. The basis of their recommendations was
not from any expressed will of the people, so their
judgment may or may not have been well-founded . The
Justice of Hungary's demands is borne out in the Sopron
plebiscite, when the inhabitants voted by a large majori-
ty to remain with Hungary, in spite of the fact the
"experts" had assigned the territory to Austria. The
Allies would grant Hungary no other opportunities for
holding plebiscites. To be sure, Hungary had nothing
to lose if the "lost" territories voted against returning
to her. On the other hand, Hungary proved that the li-
lies were wrong once. She was willing that the Allies
should oversee the holding of plebiscites. If Hungary
will be better satisfied to have the plebiscites held,
and if the Allies have made errors, (and it would be
singular if they made none), it will be better to ack-
nowledge and rectify the mista es than alloy/ them to
i
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continue as a channel of friction. After reviewing the
facts, it seems as though the Allies might well grant
the holding of more olebiscites
.
Then, too, a rounding off of the political frontiers
to fit more nearly the ethnographic boundaries would harm
no one and would satisfy the Hungarians. Studies made
since the War reveal that by special agreements land
adjustments might take place, as for instance, the Ru-
manian settlement suggested by Temper ley and cited in
this report.
The question of Hungary's commercial port was settled
through agreement with Italy in 1927, when a Convention
was signed after the two countries signed a Treaty of
Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration. By the Con-
vention Hungary again has the use of the port of Fiurae
for commercial purposes.
Hungary was embittered at the close of the 'ar by
the creation of the Little Entente, the chief purpose of
which was to see that the Treaty of Trianon was enflorced
and that Hungary did not regain her former prestige.
The Little Entente lost much of its power when Hungary
joined the League in 1922, and again when Italy de-
4
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dared her friendship and loyalty to Hungary.
The League helped Hungary to become financially,
and therefore partially economically, readjusted through
the cooperation of the Reparation Commission with a
special Financial Commission, and also through the ef-
forts of Commissioner- ' eneral Smith.
And so, in spite of the fact that Hungary was left
hardly viable by the Treaty of Trianon, outside agencies,
such as the League and alliances like that with Italy,
have helped her gain a footing in the last ten years
sufficient that she may live. She is still dissatisfied w
with the small army, lack of plebiscites, loss of terri-
tory, population, natural resources, and manufacturing
elements. A fierce Hungarian "irridentism" is being
burned into the hearts of the people of Hungary. The
Hungarians submitted to their fate in 1920 since there
was nothing else to do. Sometime they will fight for
the "Old Hungary" of the early twentieth century. Al-
though the Allies have done agreat deal to change the
conditions brought about by the terms of the Treaty,
there is still much to be done before Hungary will be a
friendly member of the family of nations. - ' *
Hungary was brought into the War because she was -a-i-
14-ecUwith Austria and because she feared Russia's support
e<
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of Pan-Slavism. She has never seemed to realize that she
has only herself to blame for the aim of the Slavs to
gratify their national aspirations at her expense. For
centuries the Magyar dominated and controlled the
destinies of the country without consulting the wishes
of the non- "agyar elements within her borders. Yet, for
her part in the crime, she was more than proportionately
punished. The economic and political chaos which brought
on by the new Treaty have not yet been completely over-
come. Nevertheless, Hungary has made a noble attempt
against heavy odds to lay foundations for gaining her
former prestige.
(.
*
(
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VI- Summary
-
Hungary was a part of the Dual Monarchy with re-
gard to foreign affairs. Though it has "been proved that
the Austrian part of this Alliance was more to blame for
causing the World War, it does not excuse Hungary for her
part in it. Tisza objected to making the Sarajevo inci-
dent an occasion for war, but weakened sufficiently so
that even he must share some blame for modifying his
point of view. He felt that if war was inevitable, this
was an opportune time. War seemed inevitable because
the restless Slavs were planning to realize their de-
sire for freedom and national unity at the expense of
Hungary, There was, then, a necessity for Hungary to
take part in this struggle if she was to maintain her
prestige in Europe. That Hungary had caused this retaliatory
program did not alter the fact that she was forced to pro-
tect herself. She came out of the struggle on the losing
side. The Allies justified the desires of the restless
peoples of Europe at hhe expense of the conquered na-
tions. Hungary lost territory, population, and pres-
tige to the newly-created Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Ru-
mania and Serbia. At the close of the War there did not
seem to be room for all these nationalities in Europe.
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The new States were given a guarantee of viability. To
make themselves more powerful they banded together in the
Little Entente. Their one great purpose was to see that
the Treaty of Trianon was enforced, and to make Hungary
a powerless neighbor. They were encourage:- by France.
While the Little Entente was making friends Hungary
was not idle. She found an ardent ally in Italy. A
Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation, and Arbitration was
signed between the two Powers in 1927. Then followed
the Convention of the Port of Flume, whereby Hungary was te
use Flume as her commercial outlet. This port had been
annexed to Italy in 1924. The support which Italy has
since given Hungary has rendered the Little Entente less
powerful and less harmful to Hungary.
During the external struggle, Hungary was having
serious Internal problems to solve. At first her Govern-
ment was unstable. There were serious revolutions, the two
most noteworthy being the Red or Bolshevik and the White
or Counter-Revolution. As soon as the Government became
more stable, there were problems of financial and econom-
ic reconstruction. The financial reconstruction was ac-
complished with the assistance of the League of Nations
and the cooperation of the Reparation Commission. The
personal leadership of Jeremiah Smith, Junior, Commissioner-
I
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General and his deep sympathy for the Hungarian problems
did much to give the Hungarians a saner attitude toward
regeneration. The financial reconstruction was so suc-
1
.
cessful and so complete that League control was termin-
ated June 30, 1926. Stabilization of finances had the ef-
fect of relieving the economic depression present after
the Treaty went into effect. Although the Treaty actually
changed Hungary from a manufacturing and industrial na-
tion to an agricultural one, she is fast readjusting her-
self to the new order of affairs. Hungary seems to he
meeting her internal problems, and with the friendship
of Italy, is solving her external problems. Instead of the
former idea that Hungary was to be sacrificed so that the
suppressed nationalities might have their day, it is
observed that with careful supervision, all these coun-
tries may be viable. It is also seen that these small
States of Europe are the occasion for various alliances
in Europe. This new system seems to be that France is
taking under her protection all the “friendly" States-
the Little Entente, and Italy is making alliances with
the "enemy" States such as Hungary. Since all of the
problems of Europe are not settled, and since the camps
are already aligning, it indicates that when provocation
is serious enough, another European conflict will take
1 ~. It is rumored that Hungary is facing the possibility
of an unbalanced budget for the present fiscal year. The
League did what it guaranteed to do- balanced the budget.
Any further discussion of this present situation is be-
yond the province of this thesis. The material on this
point is as yet unavailable.
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place
.
Hungary is still dissatisfied that more plebiscites
have not been held. The one on German West Hungary was
apparently successfully held under the supervision of
theLeague . Hungary believes that others should be tried.
Experts have observed that even if there is no transfer
of large amounts of territory, there can at least be an
adjustment whereby the border populations and boundary
lines can be changed in favor of Hungary. The ethnic and
geographic lines could coincide more nearly without dis-
turbing the newly-created States to a great extent, and
Hungary would feel more contented. Many of the points in
dispute have been adjusted through the League, but there
is still a feeling of bitterness among the Hungarians. It
is being stored within their hearts, and if carefully
cultivated and utilized at the proper time, will be valu-
able in realizing a successful Hungarian irridentist
program
.
The Hungarians want the whole matter brought before
the .or Id Court, which is a Court of International Jus-
tice, rather than the League of Nations, which is a poli-
tical body. The members of the Little Entente are satis-
1
.
fied with matters as they stand.
The reason for the change in attitude toward Hungary
1. The Nation, Feb. 22, 1925. 306
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has been due in part to the support which Italy is giving
her. Mussolini has taken a personal interest in Hungary's
internal as well as external problems. It is due also in
part to the work of certain individuals- Lord Rothermere,
for instance. Although a great many members of Parliament
have expressed their sympathy for Hungary, Downing Street
is not willing to support revision without further thought.
The fact that Hungary is not so demonstrative about her
losses is not due to any idea of reconsiliat ion, yet her
repeatedly unsuccessful attempts have dampened her ardor
for demonstration. Hungary has been finding herself of
late. Because of the end of isolation, friendship with
Italy, and victories which she has recently gained over
the Little Entente, there is being brought about a
softening of sprit toward the other Powers. She is
gaining her place in the family of nations to the discom-
fort of the Little Entente, -which for some time has been
dominating Balkan affairs. Hungary has made a great deal
of progress since she ratified the Treaty. The spirit
of enforcement has actually been changed. In spite of
this, Hungary's desire to continue the tradition of a
great past and to dominate the smaller nationalities
around her is so strong, that, given an opportunity to
regain her loss, she will cause a great deal of trouble.
Hungary is still weak, but because of the bitterness
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created within this territory, she may grow to be a
trouble-spot in the peace of Europe. She is regaining
her strength in spite of her losses. Whether one be-
lieves all the propaganda that comes to his attention or
not, there is no doubt propaganda is helping to shape the
public opinion of the world with ibfegard to the question
of revision now that the smoke screen of war has cleared
away. Nevertheless, the fierce irridentism that is be-
ing created among the Hungarian people with regard to
their lost at the Peace Conference is making the que tion
of Revision one for future consideration. The Hungarians
have been dissatisfied for so long, that perhaps they are
in a state of mind where nothing would satisfy them. T: ey
have felt that the treaty should be given a working chance.
It has been in effect "or ten years; yet the attitude remains
the same. The Hungarians have not relented an inch.
Count Sforza recommended that the Balkan affairs will
iron themselves out, if the Allies let them alone. Kun-
can actually do no harm to Europe at the present moment,
but she may cause the Powers some concern, and will bear
watching
.
1. Count Sforza- at a conference at Williamstown, Mass

133
Bibliography
Books-
Apoonyi, Albert, and others- "Justice for Hungary." Re-
view and criticism of .the effect of the Treaty of
Trianon. London, 1928. Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd.
376 pp. Ethnographic map- Teleki. Pro-Magyar in
sentiment
.
Bass, John Foster- "The Peace Tangle." The Macmillan Co.
N. Y. 1920. Maps. 345 pages. Index by topics.
Hauler, Jean- "A New Danger to the peace of Europe." 48 pp
Signed-Berne, December, 1923. No date of oublication.
No place of publication.
Birinyi, Louis K.- "The Tragedy of Hungary." Cleveland,
1924. 329 pp. Pro-Magyar. Bitterness revealed.
Birmingham, George- "A Wayfarer in Hungary." Methuen & Co.
Ltd. London, 1923. 210 pp . Especially useful chapters
The Lost Provinces, and The Future
.
Bovill, W. B. Forster- "Hungary and the Hungarians." N. Y.
The McClure Co. Methuen & Co. London. 1908. 352 pp.
Buday, Ladislas- "Dismembered Hungary." Published July,
1922. No place of publication. 288 pp., maps, dia-
grams. Important appendix, for many changes took
place about the time of the oublication of the book.
Buday, Ladislas- "La Hongrie apres le Traite de Trianon."
Budapest, 1922.
Clark, Francis E.- "Old Homes and New Americans." The
Country and the People of the Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy, and their Contribution to the New World.
Houghton, Mifflin Co. 1913. 261 pp., with illustra-
tions and maps. An essay respecting the Hungarian
immigrant, important in that it shows points of view
before treaty propaganda began to color articles.
Colquhoun, A. R. and E.- "The Whirlpool of Europe, Austria
Hungary and the Hapsburgs. Dodd, Mead & Co. N. Y.
1907. 349 pp. with maps, diagrams, and illustrations.

134
Deak, Francis, "The Hungarian Land Dispute." N. Y. 1928.
Valuable, but inclined to be pro-Magyar.
Dillon, E. J.- "inside Story of the Peace Conference. Cony-
right, 1920, by Harper and Bro . Printed in U.S.A.
Published February, 1920. 513 pp . Hungary during the
revolutionary period after the World War.
Drage, Geoffrey- "Austria- Hungary." London: John Murray,
1909. 846 pp., with maps. Good historical approach.
Fay, Sidney B. "The Origins of the Jar." N. Y. Macmillan
Co., 1928. 2 volumes. Excellent background on pan-
Slavic movement with relation to Austria-Hungary.
Fischer, Louis, "The Soviets in World Affairs". London.
J. Cape & Company. 1930.
Graham, Malbone W. Jr., assisted by R .C . Binkley- "New Govern
ments of Central Europe." N.Y. Henry Holt & Co., 1924.
683 PP. Material mostly from documents.
Gue-t, L. Haden- "The Struggle for Power in Europe, 1917-
1921. London, 1921. 318 pp. Maps. An outline, economic
and political survey of the Central States and Russia.
Hevesey, Andre de- "L'Agonie d'un Empire L'Austriche-
Hongrie Moeurs et Politique." Paris, 1923. 281 pp. pro
Magyar
.
Horvath, Clemence- "Modern Hungary." Budapest, 1922. pro-
Magyar
.
Ignotus, Hugo- "The Dismer. ber ing of Hungary." Written es-
pecially for American readers. Berlin, 1920.
Jaszi, Oscar- "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hun-
gary." London, 1924. 239 pp. Period- 1917.
Karolyi, Michael- "Fighting the World." Translation by
S.W.Dickes. Original title not given. Albert and
Charles Boni, N. Y., 1925. 464 pp. Relies on memory
occasionally. Diary dictated to his wife. Not neces-
sarily dependable.
Kellner, L., Arnold, Madame Paula, and Delisle, Arthur
"Austria and the Austrians and Hungary of the H1Jri l
gari^ns." N. Y. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914. ^n4
pp., illustrations, and maps. Exposition of "What
is Austria-Hungary?" - pages 1-12.
I
135
Mltton, G-. E., "Austria-Hungary." London: Adam and Charles
Black, 1914. 210 op. with maps and illustrations.
Mower, Paul Scott,- "Balkan! zed Europe." N. Y. 1921. E. P.
Dutton & Co. 349 pp. Maps. A studv in political
analysis and reconstruction.
Pavany, Sugen- "Some Tacts About the Proposed Dismemberment
of Hungary."
Powell, Alexander- "Embattled Borders." Eastern Eurooe from
the Balkans to the Baltic. Century Co. N. Y. London.
1928. 374 pp., illustrations.
Repington, Charles a Court- "After the War. 1920-1922." A
Diary. Boston, 1922. pages 154 to 175.
Schmitt, Pernadotte- "The Coming of the War 1914." Two
volumes. Charles Scribner's Sons. N. Y. 1930.
Teleki, Paul- "The Evolution of Kungarv and its Place in the
European History." N. Y. The Macmillan Co. 1923. 312
PP.
Vambery, Arminius- "The Story of Hungary, " from Story of the
Nations Series. N. Y. and London. G-. P. Putnam's
Sons. Knickerbocker Press. 1886. (With collaboration
of Louis Heilprin.)
Warren, Whitney- "Fiume and d'Annunzio"

136
General Documents
Annuaire General, 1928. Paris, Libra irie Larousse. 1226 pp.
Much of material duplicated in Statesman's Year Book.
d'Annunzio, Gabriele. "The Constitution of the Free State
of Flume." August 27, 1920. Translated by courtesy
of Whitney Warren. Reprinted from the Nation, October
27, 1920/
Austrian Red Book. Official Files. 3 parts. London, 1920.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Year Book, ’Wash-
ington, D. C., 1921-1926, inclusive.
Department of Overseas Trade Reports. London. Annual
Report on Commercial and Industrial Situation in Hun -
gary
.
Dated, February, 1924
.
By R.J.E. Humphreys, Com
mercial Secretary to His Majesty's Legation, Budapest.
London, By His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1924. 48
pp. Report discusses finance, industry, and production
trade, social questions, transport, and communication,
and conclusion.
Report on Commerce and Industrial Situation . Dated
March, 1925. E.C. Donaldson Rawlins, Commercial Secre-
tary to His Majesty's Legation, Budapest. London,
1925. 49 pp. Covers about the same field as pre-
vious report.
Report on Commerce and Industrial Situation
,
Revised
to April, 1926. Rawlins. 46 pp.
Report on Commercial and Industrial Situation
,
1926-
1927. By H. N. Sturrock, Commercial Secretary to His
Majesty's Legation, Budapest. 44 pp.
Cambridge Medieval and Modern History Series. Variously
planned, edited, and printed.
....
.
.
.
,
!-
.
,
.
.
;
J ...
.
.
•
.
.
.
.
.
xj >nl ^r.a oo'isi.^o nc J-*io* ©
'
,
.
.
s
137
Cambridge Medieval History. Volume IV planned by J. B.
Bury. N. Y. 1923. Volume V planned bv J. B. Bury.
N. Y. 1926.
Cambridge Modern History. V planned by the late Lord
Acton. University Press. Cambridge. 1908. VI
planned by the late Lord Acton. University Press.
Cambridge. 1909.
Encyclopedia ritannica. 13th edition. 1922, 1926. New
Volumes (3). p.825- Treaty of Trianon .
H istory of the Peace Conference. H.W.V. Temper ley. Vol.
II, III, IV, and V, including texts of treaty and
of agreements of contributions towards Acts of
Liberat ion, 1921.
Hungarian Peace Treaty (British Statesmen about the Hungari
an Question.)- Published by the Popular Literary So-
ciety, Budapest, 1921. 51 pp. Fragments of Parliamen-
tary Debates. Summary of Hungarian losses.
Hungary- The Hungarian Peace Negotiations
,
an account, re-
port of, and the Work of the Hungarian Peace Delega-
tions at Neuillv from January to March. Hornyansky,
1920 - 1922
. 3 vol.
Volume I- Speeches and documents and treaty text.
Budapest. 1921. 646 pp.
Volume II - Budapest, 1922. 573 pp. Frontiers of Hun-
gary, proposed changes, and results. Reparations,
military questions. Divergence in texts of January
15 and May 6 .
Volume III a
.
Budapest, 1920. Statistical data by
Count Paul Teleki end Mr. Ladislas Budai. In Hungari
an, French, and English. 419 pp.
Volume III b . Budapest, 1920. Contains the 4th en-
larged edition of 68 maps, 6 diagrams of Hungary.
Called "The Economies of Hungary."
League of Nations. The Financial Reconstruction of Hungary
,
General Survey and Principal Documents. Geneva, De-
cember, 1926. C.583. M. 221 . 1926 11.248 pp. General
survey by Sir Arthur Salter. General character of the
problem, solution, official texts.
Providing of Labour for the Population of Upper -Hungary
under Hungarian and Czech rule
,
by Albert Halasz. 19
pp. Mi*. Halasz is retired Royal Inspector of Industry.

15#
A treatise read on September 23, 1927, at the occasion
of the meeting of the Economic and Factory Divisions
of the Hungarian Engineers and Architect Club. Buda-
pest. No. date.
Statesman’s Year Book. Macmillan. London. 1907, 1920,
1921, 1929.
Survey of Foreign Affairs by Arnold Toynbee. 1924.
Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923
.
(2 vols.) Vol. I . Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1924, N. Y. 649
pp., maps. Contains Treaty of Versailles, Treaty of
St. Germain-en-Laye, and the Treaty of Trianon.
Treaty of Peace with Hungary . Published by the Hungarian
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Budapest, 1921. Prin-
ting office of Victor Hornyansky. Propaganda pamphlet
included. Edited by Imre Radvanyi
.
Budapest, VI.
Terez-korut 26.
Work and Wealth of Austria-Hungary- American Institute,
Berlin. Introduction by R. L. Orchelle. Continental
Times Co. Berlin, 1916. (A series of articles
surveying economic, financial and industrial conditions
in the Dual Monarchy during the World War. 40 pp.
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Bi-Monthly and Quarterly Publications-
Foreign Affairs, and American Quarterly Review . Published by
Foreign Affairs, N. Y. 6 volumes to date. Vol. 2-6.
"Hungary in the New Europe, " by Count Stephen Bethlen
Ills 445-458.
"Dismembered Hungary and Peace in Central Europe," by
Oscar Jaszi. II: 270-281. Realizes he is biased, but
draws Dicture vividly to get subject across.
"Flood Peril in Hungary," by Erdmann D. Benyon . IV:
682-685
.
"Reconstruction of Hungary," Sir Arthur Salter. V:
91-102. Deals with financial reconstruction.
"Hungary's Access to the Sea," by H. F. Armstrong. V:
675-677.
"How the Hungarian Frontiers were Drawn, " Harold Tem-
perley. VI: 432-447. Pro-Rumanian and pro-Serbian.
League of Nations, Postwar Political Alignments . Vol. VI,
No. 2. 1923. Published bi-monthly, World Peace Founda-
tion, Boston.
"The Little Entente." pages 112 to 122.
"The Hapsburg Restoration Movement." pages 234 to 129.
"Protection of Minorities." March 1, 1923. p.308.
Monthlies-
C ontemporary Review
,
The Contemporary Review Co. Ltd. Lon-
don
.
"Hungary's Appeal to England"- June, 1920. C.H. Wright.
"Patriotism in Hungary" - Leonard Woolf. September, 1922.
N.Y. Times- Current History- Published by the N. Y. Times.
"Hungary Menaced on Three Sides," June, 1919: 466-469.
"Hungary Under Communist Rule" - July, 1919: 77-79.
"Hungary and the Entente"- August, 1919: 268-271,
"Fall of Hungarian Soviet" - September, 1919: 477-486.
"Hungary and the Neighbouring States" - July 1920: 615-618,
"The Horthy Regime" - E.S. Bagger. August, 1920: 875-877.
Observations on Count Rothermere’s Position. Oct. 1927:
140-141.
"Mutilated Hungary"- 1928. p.927.
"Hungary." Frederick Ogg, Professor of Political Sci-
ence, Universit of Wisconsin. Various statements.
North American Review- North American Review Corporation. N.Y.
"Hungary since the Armistice." July, 1923. 218: 23-36.
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Bi-Weekly publications-
Foreign Policy Information Service. Bi-weekly, Foreign
Policy Association. N. Y.
"The Little Entente." Editorial. Vol. IV. No. iv. Septem-
ber 14, 1928.
Weekly publications-
L'Europe Nouvelle. Ed. L. Weiss. Paris. Pub. Feb. 4, 1928.
"Note Yougo slave a M. Briand sur la fin du controle miii-
taire en Hongrie." April 9, 1927.
"Response de M. Briand." April 9, 1927.
"Note du ministere des affaires etrangeres de Hongrie
au ministre des Etats-Unis a Budapest." March 23, 1929. 319.
Literary Digest
.
Punk and Wagnalls.
"Hungary's Need of Help." May 26, 1923. p. 22.
"Mussolini Advises Hungary." December 7, 1929. p. 16.
The Nation
.
The Nation Press. N. Y.
"Political Program of Hungary," Feb. 22, 1919. 306.
"Hungary and the League of Nations." E. A. Bagger. May 31,
1919. 886-888.
"The Dismemberment of Hungary." April 5, 1919. 530-531.
"Treaty of Tirana", Dec. 18, 1926. 411-412.
The Near East and India
.
Burlington Publishing Co. Ltd.
London. XXXII-292. Editorial "Trianon and Try-anon."
The New Europe- Published weekly for four years, 1916-1920.
Eyre and 3pottiswoode Ltd. London. Joint editors- R.W.
Seton-V/at son and A.F. Whyte. Reprints and points of view
quoted
,
"An Austrian Conservative Voice on Western Hungary."
Extracts from Die Politick, the Viennese Conservative
Weekly, oublished June 5. August 5, 1920. Vol. XVI, 199.
"The Little Entente" by Edouard Benes. Sept. 9, 1920.
XVI, 204.
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The New Republic. New Republic Publishing Co. Inc. N. Y.
A journal of opinion published weekly.
"Reconstructing Hungary." E.3. Bagger. May 19, 1924.
sup. 3-6.
"Reconstructing Hungary." Wm. Goode. June 25, 1924.
Daily-
N
, Y. Times- Articles, 1920-1931. For the most part these
articles were unsigned, and sent through the Associated
Press in the form of Soecial Dispatches. There are a
few communications to the editor bearing personal 6-
pinions. Vfriile not too much weight is given to these
news dispatches, it must be remembered that one has
to depend largely on current publications to supoly
the information on a current topic.
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